Iran denies teachers are quitting despite viral resignation videos
A teacher embraces a young student in a girls’ classroom in Iran's southern port city of Bushehr, September 2026
Iran’s Education Ministry dismissed reports of teacher resignations over working conditions and security pressure as a “rumor,” despite numerous videos of teachers announcing departures and a teachers’ council warning of a growing exodus.
Education Ministry spokesman Ali Farhadi said Friday that reports of teacher resignations were “not true” and accused unspecified actors of trying to undermine in-person education.
“The resignation of teachers is a rumor,” Farhadi told the Tasnim news agency, saying teachers and students had welcomed the return to classrooms across the country, including in southern provinces such as Hormozgan.
But the Coordinating Council of Iranian Teachers’ Trade Associations has offered a sharply different account, saying numerous videos and reports of resignations have emerged from different parts of the country in recent weeks.
The council said teachers were leaving because of a combination of wages below the poverty line, worsening living conditions, administrative pressures and what it described as the securitization of the profession, including dismissals, suspensions, arrests and legal cases against teachers and union activists.
It warned that experienced teachers were being driven out of classrooms by policies that had pushed the education system toward decline.
Videos circulating on social media in recent days have shown teachers announcing their resignations and citing financial hardship, workload and a lack of recognition for their work.
The dispute comes as Iran’s education system is already grappling with teacher shortages and longstanding discontent over pay and working conditions.
Teachers have repeatedly protested over salaries and benefits, including at a demonstration outside the Planning and Budget Organization in Tehran in September.
Labor activists have also warned that financial pressures are forcing some teachers to work multiple jobs, while shortages of teaching staff are affecting the quality of education.
The resignations have emerged against a wider backdrop of pressure on teachers and union activists, who in recent years have faced arrests, prison sentences, dismissal and suspension from work.
The Coordinating Council rejected the government’s portrayal of the unrest in schools as the product of outside agitation, arguing that the discontent stems instead from conditions within the education system itself.
Whether the resignations amount to the “wave” described by the teachers’ council is difficult to establish. The pressures it says are driving teachers out are considerably easier to document.
Visitors look at vehicles on display at the seventh Tehran Auto Show in the Iranian capital, September 2026
Iran’s stock market is breaking records even as the dollar and gold hit new highs, an apparent contradiction that may point to the same dynamic: households and investors scrambling to protect their wealth as the rial weakens and the economic toll of the Iran-US war grows.
Before trading closed on Wednesday, the final working day of the week in Iran, the Tehran Stock Exchange reached a record 7,766,000 points.
The market has risen 109 percent since the start of the Iranian year, while small investors poured roughly 4.7 trillion tomans, or about $19 million, into shares in a single day.
Iran’s prominent economic daily Donya-ye Eghtesad argues that the surge is not necessarily a sign of confidence. People are buying shares as political and economic risks rise, it says, while savers are also moving into gold, coins and dollars, all of which hit record highs on the same day.
The open-market dollar has passed 250,000 tomans, while measured in dollars, the stock market remains well below previous peaks.
At least part of the rally therefore appears to reflect a search for protection against the falling rial rather than confidence in the underlying economy.
Similar pressures are visible in consumer markets, where prices for cheaper mobile phones rose 33 to 42 percent in a month, outpacing the currency’s decline as import quotas, registration rules and fees hit lower-priced devices particularly hard.
Earlier this week, the government announced that the central bank would sell up to $2 billion in cash. The first $1 billion tranche is being sold through banks, with adults holding a national ID card allowed to buy up to $10,000.
The government’s own newspaper, Iran, warned that selling cash may slow the dollar’s rise but cannot reverse the underlying trend while inflation, budget pressures and political uncertainty remain unresolved.
Tehran’s prosecutor also ordered action against “market disruptors,” including online channels publishing exchange rates. Eyewitnesses on Ferdowsi Avenue, the capital’s main currency-trading hub, reported shorter queues and more sellers than buyers on September 30.
The respite was brief. On October 1, the open-market dollar rose 1.49 percent to 2,593,000 rials, its highest level in a year.
The central bank has been steadily raising the official exchange rate, from about 137,000 to more than 174,000 tomans this year, to encourage exporters to repatriate their foreign-currency earnings. Even so, the open-market rate remains much higher.
Because official imports are priced at the exchange-center rate, increases can feed through into the cost of imported goods. They also reduce the real value of the government’s electronic food-voucher scheme unless the state spends more rials to maintain it.
Hardline outlets including Kayhan and the IRGC-linked Javan portray the rial’s fall as part of Washington’s economic war. But their criticism is also directed at Iranian policymakers.
Kayhan calls currency sales a repeatedly failed policy and a waste of resources in wartime. It wants the government to reverse its economic liberalization and use judicial and security pressure to force exporters to repatriate their foreign-currency earnings.
The criticism exposes an argument within the establishment over how Tehran should respond: spend scarce foreign currency trying to contain demand, or preserve it while tightening controls over exporters and the domestic market.
That argument is becoming more urgent as the US blockade curtails Iranian oil exports, depriving Tehran of a major source of foreign currency.
Diplomacy could provide some relief, with Iran seeking access to frozen assets and an easing of sanctions and the blockade as part of negotiations with Washington.
For now, however, the clearest signal comes from the markets themselves. Stocks, gold and the dollar are all setting records. The simultaneous rush into them suggests that for many Iranians, almost anything that might preserve its value increasingly looks preferable to holding rials.
An appeals court in Tehran has upheld a one-year prison sentence for renowned actress Elnaz Shakerdoost over an Instagram story mourning people killed during January’s protests, her lawyer said Friday.
The ruling also upheld a two-year ban on political, online and artistic activity imposed by Branch 23 of Tehran’s Revolutionary Court, which convicted her of “propaganda against the system.”
Her lawyer, Houshang Pourbabayi, said the post expressed grief and sympathy for those killed and contained no call for collective action or reference to state institutions.
Shakerdoost, 42, is one of Iran’s best-known film actresses and has worked in Iranian cinema for more than two decades. In 2019, she won the performance prize at the International Political Film Festival of Carcassonne in France for When the Moon Was Full, which also won the festival’s Grand Prize.
In August, human rights activists reported that nearly 100 prominent Iranians, including artists and filmmakers, had been summoned by security agencies or judicial authorities after speaking out against the new wave of executions, particularly the public hanging of protesters in Isfahan.
More than 20 of those summoned were well-known film and television actors, a civil rights activist said.
The report said those targeted had been among public figures posting against the executions under the hashtag “No to executions.”
Shortly after the brutal crackdown on January protests, acclaimed Iranian filmmaker Jafar Panahi warned that the Islamic Republic was intimidating artists to erase evidence of the massacre, citing the killing of a fellow director as the reality the authorities were trying to suppress.
Panahi said on Instagram that the killing of filmmaker Javad Ganji has been followed by an escalating campaign of intimidation against artists aimed at erasing the truth about protest deaths.
Panahi said directors Majid Barzegar and Behtash Sanaeiha were separately summoned and harshly interrogated for hours over a joint statement condemning state violence, warning that more cinema professionals are expected to face summons and that heavy judicial cases are already open.
Hamid Kouhsari was carrying a wounded woman on his back through the streets of Gorgan on January 8 when security forces shot him from behind. He spent the next eight months in hiding with his leg untreated, before leaving Iran.
Kouhsari, 31, told Iran International that during the January 2026 uprising he saw security forces use violence unlike anything he had witnessed before in Gorgan, the capital of Golestan province in northern Iran, including the shooting of a toddler in the face. He spoke from a location that is being withheld because he fears reprisals from the Iranian authorities.
Security forces opened fire directly on crowds on January 8 as demonstrations swelled across the city, he said.
"You couldn't believe what you were seeing," he said. "They pointed their weapons directly at the crowd and opened fire. People were falling like sparrows."
Kouhsari had taken part in the November 2019 protests and in the 2022 protests that followed the death in morality police custody of Mahsa Amini, who had been detained for allegedly violating Iran's hijab rules. Nothing he saw then, he said, compared with January.
"It was unimaginable," he said. "They were firing bursts into the middle of the crowd."
‘The hardest part’
The scene that affected him most, Kouhsari said, involved a couple carrying a child he thought was about two years old.
"The hardest part for me was when there was a husband and wife with a child, about two years old, in their arms," he said.
All three were caught in the gunfire, he said. The father was hit below the waist, and the mother in her face, neck and abdomen. Kouhsari and others moved the parents toward people helping the wounded.
In the chaos, his attention turned to their child.
"I was thinking about the child in all that fear and panic," he said.
He realized he could no longer hear the toddler crying, he said, and then saw the child lying near the curb.
"I was just praying the child wasn't dead, that they were unconscious," he said.
When he picked the child up, he saw a severe gunshot wound to the face.
"Half of the child's face was gone from the bullet," he said.
Kouhsari said he screamed and began crying, then carried the child to a woman helping the wounded.
"I told her, 'This is their child too. Wherever you sent the mother and father, send the child there as well.'"
He never learned what happened to the family.
Shot while carrying a wounded woman
Later that night, another wounded woman begged him for help.
"Help me. Don't let them kill me," he recalled her saying.
Kouhsari lifted her onto his back and began carrying her toward the crowd.
"I told her, even if I die myself, I won't let you die here," he said.
As he neared the other protesters, security forces shot him from behind in the right leg.
He managed a few more steps before collapsing. Protesters pulled him into the crowd and used scarves and shoelaces to stem the bleeding.
Video reviewed by Iran International shows Kouhsari lying in a house where he was hiding, his wounded leg bleeding into a container, visibly in pain.
A screengrab of footage showing Hamid Kouhsari receiving makeshift treatment for a gunshot wound to his right leg while in hiding after the January 8 protests in Gorgan.
He could not risk going to a hospital, he said, and was afraid even to try to get medicine from a pharmacy, because wounded protesters were being identified and detained.
"I wasn't afraid of being shot," he said. "I was terrified they would come and take me away."
That fear came from what happened after the November 2019 protests. Kouhsari said he was detained and later summoned to a Revolutionary Guards facility in Gorgan, where over several hours he was pressured into recording a confession.
His father, he said, was a veteran of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war and was wounded in it. Decades later, the son was shot by his own country's security forces in the street.
A doctor who later examined his leg privately told him it needed surgery because of damage to the bone and nerves, Kouhsari said.
The operation never happened.
Kalashnikovs, pellet guns and lasers
Kouhsari said he saw security forces use Kalashnikov-type rifles and pellet guns on January 8, as well as a weapon he could not identify.
He also described gunmen positioned above the streets, and protesters being marked with lasers before they were shot from those elevated positions.
"They would keep the laser on them even when they went into the crowd," he said. "The sniper from above would shoot the people they had marked with the laser."
Separate CCTV footage from Gorgan on January 9, obtained and verified by Iran International, shows security forces using lasers during the crackdown.
Kouhsari said Reza Asadi, a protester killed by live fire in Gorgan on January 8, was among those he saw marked with a laser before being shot.
CCTV footage obtained and verified by Iran International shows security forces using lasers in Gorgan on January 9, a day after Hamid Kouhsari said protesters were targeted with similar tactics.
A body taken, a family kept searching
Among those killed that night was Kouhsari's relative Mostafa Kouhsari, a father of two from Azadshahr, about 75 kilometers east of Gorgan.
Mostafa was shot at around 9 p.m., Kouhsari said, and died on the way to the hospital as protesters tried to save him.
Revolutionary Guards forces took his body, Kouhsari said, and for four days the family had no word of where he was. After days of searching, they found him at a morgue in Gonbad-e Kavus, a city in the north of the province.
Mostafa Kouhsari was shot by security forces during the January 8 protests and died on the way to hospital, according to his relative Hamid Kouhsari.
Intelligence agents then escorted the body back to Viro, a village east of Gorgan, and pressed the family not to hold a public funeral, Kouhsari said. Mostafa was buried there at around 6 a.m.
The pressure continued after the burial. The family held no memorial at the village mosque and instead marked the third, seventh and 40th days after his death, the customary points of mourning in Iran, privately at Mostafa's home.
Others close to him were also killed, Kouhsari said, but some of their families had asked him not to name them for fear of reprisals.
Eight months in hiding
With his leg still badly injured, Kouhsari went into hiding.
For about eight months, he said, he moved between car washes, cattle sheds, abandoned houses and remote villas belonging to friends.
"When I heard the sound of police, the hair on my body would stand up," he said.
Friends brought him food and medicine. The surgery the doctor had said he needed never took place.
His fear of being found grew after a friend was detained. The man revealed information under torture, Kouhsari said, and he became increasingly afraid the authorities could identify him.
In the end, facing the threat of arrest and fearing for his life, he was forced to leave Iran.
A final goodbye
Before leaving, Kouhsari photographed his home after emptying it of his belongings.
He could not properly say goodbye to much of his family, he said, and does not know when he will see them again.
"Saying goodbye to my mother was very hard," he said.
Hamid Kouhsari
One of his last memories is of saying goodbye to his dog, whom he left with a friend.
"When I was saying goodbye to my dog, I saw my whole family in that animal," he said.
"The night I left Iran, for the first time in eight months I was able to sleep peacefully."
Staff at a repair workshop in Isfahan’s Amir Kabir industrial district, where businesses serving trucks and heavy machinery have reported a sharp drop in activity. (ILNA)
Business at one of central Iran’s main heavy-vehicle service hubs has fallen by about 30% from a year earlier, offering a ground-level view of an economy where soaring food prices, a battered currency and weaker freight activity are squeezing workers and small businesses.
The Amir Kabir industrial area in Isfahan is home to mechanics, machinists, body shops, battery specialists and parts dealers serving trucks, construction equipment and mining machinery. Labor news agency ILNA said activity across the district had fallen sharply as transport demand weakened and the cost of keeping vehicles on the road climbed.
“When freight activity slows and less cargo is being moved, drivers face serious problems,” a person working in the district told ILNA. “Most drivers bought their vehicles on installment, so besides making loan payments, they also have to cover the high cost of supporting their families.”
The slowdown comes as Iranian households face some of the steepest price increases in years. Official data for September showed consumer prices were 89.8% higher than a year earlier, while average inflation over the preceding 12 months reached 73.6%. Food and drink prices had already risen 127.5% year on year in August.
Reuters reported in September that food prices had more than doubled while the wider economy was being squeezed by sanctions, restrictions on oil exports and the costs of the seven-month conflict with the United States.
Iran’s currency has added another layer of pressure. The rial fell beyond 2.5 million to the US dollar on the free market earlier this week, a record low, compared with roughly 1.1 million a year earlier.
For businesses dependent on imported equipment, that fall feeds quickly into prices.
“Parts dealers buy according to the day’s dollar rate,” an Amir Kabir business operator said, adding that prices often fail to come back down even when the rial temporarily strengthens.
“The consumer and the worker end up carrying the greatest burden,” he said.
The industrial district illustrates how weakness in one part of Iran’s economy spreads quickly into others.
A single truck can generate work for engine mechanics, gearbox specialists, machinists, painters, welders, upholsterers and parts sellers before it gets back on the road. When freight volumes fall, drivers delay repairs and workshops lose business.
“There’s a deep slowdown across the industrial area,” the tradesperson said. “It’s not that the vehicles don’t need work. Purchasing power and liquidity have fallen sharply.”
Some vehicles are repaired but then sit idle because there is no cargo to move, he said. Even when transport work is available, delayed payments from cargo owners leave drivers and workshops short of cash.
That weakness is also reflected in accounts shared with Iran International, with Iranians describing cuts to spending on food, housing and medicine as savings run down and private-sector job losses spread.
Cheap parts bring expensive problems
Workshop owners are also grappling with replacement parts that they say are either prohibitively expensive or of poorer quality.
A local tradesperson told ILNA that original components for older European and American heavy vehicles had become difficult to obtain, leaving operators increasingly dependent on Chinese-made replacements.
“In the past, if you rebuilt a Volvo or Mack with original parts, it could run for years without another major repair,” he said. “Now poor-quality parts mean repeated breakdowns.”
Original parts can still sometimes be found, he added, but at prices that often make them uneconomical for truck owners already dealing with loans, insurance and weaker freight income.
The result is a cycle in which operators choose cheaper parts, suffer more frequent failures and return to workshops while having less money available to pay for the repairs.
The downturn is beginning to affect hiring and job security.
A machining workshop may employ 10 to 12 people repairing engine blocks, crankshafts and other heavy components. With business down and insurance, municipal charges and other expenses still rising, workshop owners may stop taking on workers or begin cutting staff, according to ILNA.
“A workshop with 10 or 12 workers may no longer want to expand its workforce and may even reduce the number of employees because its income cannot cover its costs,” a local business owner said.
The impact could outlast the immediate downturn. Training an experienced technician can take about a decade, he said, but workshops have less incentive to bring in apprentices when they are unsure whether they can retain existing staff.
Pressure reaches beyond Isfahan
The problems in Amir Kabir mirror a broader contraction in everyday economic activity as the government struggles with reduced oil revenues, sanctions and restrictions on trade.
US pressure has sharply reduced Iran’s access to foreign currency from oil exports, while sanctions evasion has become more costly. That has made imported equipment and raw materials harder to finance just as the rial’s fall raises their local-currency price.
For the workers and drivers in Isfahan, however, the crisis comes down to a simpler calculation: there is less work, while virtually everything needed to do that work costs more.
“If prices are going to remain high, then at the very least the volume of work has to increase,” a local tradesperson told ILNA. “Businesses need enough cash flow to keep operating.”
File photo: Ships dock at Anzali Port on Iran’s Caspian Sea coast
With war disrupting Iran’s southern trade routes, Tehran is looking north to the Caspian for alternatives. But the available evidence suggests they cannot replace its crucial oil exports.
More cargo moving across the Caspian could help Iran keep supplies coming in. But rising freight totals do not show whether Tehran has found a practical alternative for exporting oil.
To establish that, we need to know what is being shipped, where it is going and what trade it replaces.
Grain and industrial goods can ease shortages; crude needs its own export infrastructure and buyers. Iran’s oil swaps at Neka show both what the northern route can offer and what it cannot.
What the freight numbers measure
Russia’s Ministry of Transport reported 1.8 million tonnes of freight on the trans-Caspian route in 2025 and 1.3 million tonnes in the first half of 2026. It separately reported maritime freight of 2.8 million tonnes in 2025 and about 4.5 million tonnes in the first seven months of 2026.
The figures point to increased activity, but the ministry does not break the cargo down by Iranian origin, Iranian destination or commodity.
The North–South Transport Corridor spans several countries, routes and modes. Cargo can transit Iran without being Iranian trade or move between other participating countries.
A corridor-wide increase could reflect transit shipments, trade between third countries or Iranian goods rerouted from elsewhere. The aggregate numbers do not distinguish among them.
Nor should the route and maritime figures be added together as if they measure the same flow. The ministry presents them separately and does not provide enough detail to establish how their coverage overlaps.
Evidence of genuine substitution requires knowing what cargo moved, where and which route it replaced. Grain rerouted from a southern port to northern Iran would demonstrate substitution for that cargo.
A shipment merely transiting Iran would demonstrate corridor use, not replacement of lost Iranian trade.
Imports and exports are different problems
Northern routes can still be valuable for Iran. Food, feed and industrial inputs can support domestic supply during a disruption. But that resilience should not be confused with replacing oil revenue.
Around 90% of Iran’s crude exports normally pass through Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf, according to Reuters. Bringing goods into northern Iran does not automatically provide the terminals, pipelines and shipping arrangements needed to move Iranian crude to international buyers.
Iran’s ports have nominal annual capacity of about 300 million tonnes, but only around 30 million tonnes is in the north, according to figures cited by Al Jazeera. One large vessel in the south can potentially carry as much cargo as 20 Caspian ships.
The question is not simply whether trade can move north, but whether those routes can serve the same economic purpose at comparable scale.
Neka was not an oil-export system
Iran’s Neka terminal was connected by pipeline to refineries in Tehran and Tabriz. Under previous oil-swap arrangements, crude from Caspian producers was delivered to Neka and processed in northern Iran. Iran then made an equivalent volume of its own crude available for export through Kharg.
The arrangement helped supply northern refineries while freeing Iranian crude elsewhere for export. It did not eliminate reliance on southern export infrastructure.
Swap volumes peaked at about 110,000 barrels per day in June 2006, fell to almost zero by 2011 and did not subsequently resume at scale, according to Lee and Kalyuzhnova. Changes in relative pricing were among the factors that made the route less attractive.
Infrastructure alone therefore does not create a durable oil route. The economics of each barrel, the terms of any swap and the availability of buyers matter too.
Any claim that Neka now provides a meaningful export alternative requires current evidence: how much crude is arriving, whether it is being refined, swapped or exported, and where any exported Iranian barrels actually leave the country.
Who controls the alternative?
Moscow’s transport ministry links freight growth to Russian-Iranian cooperation and identifies the unfinished Rasht–Astara railway as a key project.
The more important question is whether Iranian access depends on a limited number of suppliers, carriers, financiers or cross-border arrangements. Iran could gain another route while still having little control over the terms on which it operates.
That is not inevitable. A corridor involving several suppliers and transport partners could give Tehran more options.
The test is whether cargo can move regularly at competitive cost, with workable payment and customs arrangements, without a single partner becoming a bottleneck.
What would an alternative look like?
The available figures establish that activity on parts of the northern corridor has increased. They do not establish how much Iranian trade has been rerouted, whether those routes are commercially sustainable or whether they can substitute for oil-export capacity.
The Caspian may give Iran useful alternatives for specific shipments. Whether that amounts to strategic diversification depends on what Iran can move, at what scale, where it can send it and who sets the terms.
For now, rising freight totals are a starting point for that analysis, not proof that Iran has built a northern substitute for its oil-export system.