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Iran eases Korean appliance curbs through informal border trade

Sep 27, 2026, 02:29 GMT+1
Poverty pushes many in western border regions into kolbari, the hazardous practice of carrying goods on one’s back across the border
Poverty pushes many in western border regions into kolbari, the hazardous practice of carrying goods on one’s back across the border

Iran on Saturday expanded limited imports of South Korean home appliances through its border trade system, five years after Ali Khamenei ordered restrictions on products from LG and Samsung.

Iran’s Trade Promotion Organization said the change applies to goods brought in by border carriers, seafarers and border cooperatives, while imports of major appliances through normal commercial channels remain prohibited.

The clarification came after Iranian media initially reported a broader lifting of restrictions on Samsung and LG.

Rather than reopening commercial imports, the measure expands a narrow exception tied specifically to Iran’s border economy.

It allows more trade and income to flow through border areas without formally abandoning a policy associated directly with Khamenei and the state’s longstanding protection of domestic manufacturers.

Destitute and discontent

Poverty and scarce employment have pushed even children and teenagers in western border regions into kolbari, the hazardous practice of carrying goods on one’s back across the border.

Allowing more goods through cooperatives and border traders could therefore provide a limited economic pressure valve.

Officials have not described the measure as an attempt to reduce discontent, but the decision to channel the exception through mechanisms designed around border employment gives it a distinct geographic focus.

Economic deprivation in Iran’s border regions also overlaps with longstanding political and security tensions. Kurdish-majority areas along the Iraqi border, where kolbari is widespread, have repeatedly seen deadly crackdowns and armed confrontations with security forces.

Protectionism

The move also comes as the industry the ban was designed to protect is itself struggling. Five years later, the objectives of the protectionist policy remain elusive.

Refrigerator production has fallen 25% year-on-year, television production 36% and washing-machine output 42%, according to the Statistical Center of Iran.

Home-appliance prices in August were 117% higher than a year earlier, while Iranian producers still import roughly $1.2 billion of components annually for four major appliance categories.

Protection has also reduced consumer choice, with the burden falling unevenly. Foreign appliances have continued to reach more affluent Iranians through unofficial channels, while lower-income consumers have fewer alternatives.

With Samsung and LG outside the normal import network, access to authorized sales, spare parts and after-sales service has also become more difficult.

Who bears the cost?

The pattern resembles Iran’s automobile industry, where imports were banned or severely restricted for years while domestic producers were shielded from foreign competition.

Khamenei himself acknowledged in 2022 that domestic car quality was poor and that public complaints were justified. Subsequent attempts to reopen imports have remained tightly controlled.

Here too, the burden has been uneven. Lower-income consumers have fewer alternatives, while wealthier Iranians have greater ability to obtain imported and luxury vehicles through more expensive channels.

The result is a recurring pattern in Iran’s protected industries. Import restrictions create scarcity and opportunities for intermediaries while imposing the greatest costs on consumers with the fewest resources.

The latest appliance measure loosens one part of that system without dismantling it: a narrow opening at the borders, while the protectionist structure that produced many of the distortions remains intact.

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Iran’s oil industry has too many masters

Sep 27, 2026, 00:36 GMT+1
•
Mehdi Moslehi
100%
The P4 offshore platform at Iran’s Reshadat oil field in the Persian Gulf, June 2026

The problem facing Iran’s oil industry is not just sanctions or a shortage of investment. It is a question of governance: who makes decisions, who signs contracts, who receives the money and, ultimately, who is accountable?

Iran’s oil industry is more than a collection of wells, pipelines and refineries. What turns those assets into an industry is an integrated chain of reservoir expertise, production planning, engineering, safety, financing, sales and accountability.

That chain has been badly fragmented. In the past two decades, especially under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, projects have been handed to military institutions, shares and assets transferred to pension funds and quasi-state bodies, and even oil cargoes used to cover budget shortfalls in organizations outside the Oil Ministry.

Unless a future Iran addresses that fragmentation, billions of dollars in investment and the most advanced technology could simply reproduce the old disorder on a larger scale.

From privatization to quasi-state ownership

The Ahmadinejad government accelerated the sale of state assets in the name of privatization, but much of the process did not produce an independent private sector.

Academic Kevan Harris has described the process as a form of pseudo-privatization: assets and privileges moved from one part of the state to pension funds, foundations, affiliated companies and military institutions without producing genuinely competitive markets, transparent ownership or public accountability.

In oil and gas, the Oil Ministry and its subsidiaries lost some of their practical authority over contractors, projects, procurement and, at times, the sale of oil.

One of the starkest examples was the decision to give oil cargoes to Iran’s police force to sell. Esmail Ahmadi-Moghaddam, then commander of Iran’s police, acknowledged in 2014 that during Ahmadinejad’s presidency the force had been given two oil cargoes to sell, with some of the proceeds intended to cover a salary shortfall.

The budgets of the police, ministries or pension funds should be recorded in the state budget and paid through the treasury, not financed by giving individual institutions a company, refinery, oilfield or oil cargo. Such arrangements erase the boundaries between owner, policymaker, client, contractor and seller.

Khatam al-Anbiya: one name, a network of interests

Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters is the economic and engineering arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, but it should not be understood as a conventional, integrated company.

It serves as an umbrella over numerous holdings, affiliated companies and subcontractors. Reuters reported in 2015 on the extensive network of companies linked to the IRGC and the difficulty of identifying their ultimate owners. A “contract with Khatam,” therefore, did not necessarily mean a clear chain of command, auditing and responsibility.

Under Ahmadinejad, the network received major contracts without effective competition. In 2011, Reuters reported that two pipeline contracts, each worth $1.3 billion, had been awarded to Khatam. Development of phases 15 and 16 of the South Pars gas field had also been awarded to the organization.

The result was multiple centers of power, allowing projects to be divided among different entities and responsibility to become diluted along the chain.

The consequences were technical as well as financial. Oil production requires reservoir engineers, drilling specialists, safety personnel and procurement departments to work under common standards and a coherent system.

Fragmenting projects among institutions with different missions and unclear accountability also fragments expertise and decision-making.

‘One sheikh in Bahrain, forty sheikhs in Iran’

I saw something of this problem during my own time working for Shell in the Netherlands.

I once asked the Dutch manager responsible for Iran why Shell had ended its activities in the country. I remember the essence of his answer like this: “We went to Bahrain because there we dealt with one sheikh; in Iran, we had to deal with forty sheikhs.”

Khatam might formally be the contracting party on a project, he explained, but another unit within the same network could then say it was responsible for security along part of the pipeline and demand a separate payment.

His point, as I understood it, was that instead of one accountable client, a foreign company could find itself dealing with multiple centers making separate demands for payment.

This is my recollection of an unrecorded conversation, not documentary evidence explaining Shell’s departure from Iran. The public record points principally to sanctions and political pressure: Reuters reported in 2008 that Shell withdrew from a planned Iranian gas project amid US pressure.

But sanctions and domestic disorder are not mutually exclusive explanations. Sanctions raised the cost of entering Iran; multiple centers of power raised the cost of staying.

The conversation illustrated the problem: when the contractual counterparty is known but the number of parties making demands is not, neither the true cost of a project nor responsibility for it can easily be calculated.

The Baku lesson

Another experience may offer a useful lesson for Iran’s future.

While working for BP, I travelled to Baku on a short assignment concerning contractor-selection models. An Azerbaijani colleague described how the country had used foreign partnerships after the collapse of the Soviet Union to modernize technology and develop its domestic workforce.

Azerbaijan did not hand its oil industry to BP. Under a production-sharing agreement signed in 1994, BP became operator of the Azeri, Chirag and deepwater Gunashli fields, while Azerbaijan’s state oil company SOCAR remained the principal domestic partner.

More important for Iran was the emphasis on local capacity. Training technicians, developing local suppliers and progressively replacing foreign personnel with Azerbaijani workers became part of the project. BP says it now directly employs around 2,380 Azerbaijani citizens, while Azerbaijanis have made up around 90% of its professional workforce in the country.

The lesson is not that Iran should hand management of its oil industry to BP. It is that an international operator can be selected for a particular project, targets set for training and localization, and domestic personnel left with greater technological knowledge and experience.

An architecture for Iran’s oil industry

Rebuilding Iran’s oil industry should begin with rebuilding its institutions, not redistributing the spoils.

Oil and gas should remain public assets. Parliament should establish the legal and financial framework, the government determine energy policy, and an independent professional regulator oversee licensing, safety, reservoir protection and environmental standards.

The referee must also be separated from the player. The National Iranian Oil Company should operate as a commercial and technical enterprise rather than simultaneously acting as regulator, client, partner, supervisor and arbiter of disputes.

Military and non-specialist institutions should gradually be removed from the industry. The process should be legal, audited and phased so existing projects are not abandoned.

Specific fields, refineries and infrastructure projects could instead be offered through transparent international tenders. Foreign companies could compete to operate or participate in individual projects, but no company or country should acquire a monopoly over the industry.

Contracts should be time-limited and contain measurable requirements for costs, production, environmental standards, Iranian employment and technology transfer, with extensions dependent on independent assessments rather than political connections.

Contracts, ownership, payments, costs, production and project revenues should generally be public, with auditing independent of the Oil Ministry, NIOC and contractors.

Contracts, ownership, payments, costs, production and project revenues should generally be public, with auditing independent of the Oil Ministry, NIOC and contractors.

Iran will also have to reassemble its human capital. Specialists inside the country, Iranian oil professionals abroad and a younger generation of engineers should be connected through a national program of training and succession. Foreign contractors should be required to build Iranian counterpart teams, not foreign islands inside the industry.

Rebuilding trust

Iran will need foreign investment and technology to restore production and modernize its refineries. But the need for capital should not be confused with surrendering sovereignty.

A homeowner can hire international architects and contractors without handing them ownership of the house. A future Iranian government can similarly benefit from competition among foreign companies while keeping ownership of resources, policymaking and ultimate authority in Iranian hands.

Iran’s oil can become a national asset again only when every contract has an accountable party, every project an auditable account and every decision a clearly defined legal authority.

The answer to the problem of “forty sheikhs” is not to create a new sheikh, Iranian or foreign. It is to build a single, transparent and professional system in which no commander, foundation, ministry or foreign company stands above the law.

Pezeshkian’s Fox News nuclear overture draws hardline backlash

Sep 26, 2026, 00:15 GMT+1
•
Maryam Sinaiee
100%

Iranian hardliners have intensified attacks on President Masoud Pezeshkian after he signalled nuclear flexibility and backed negotiations with Washington in a Fox News interview.

Conservative officials and media outlets had largely welcomed Pezeshkian’s speech to the UN General Assembly on Wednesday, but his comments to Fox News a day later provoked a sharp backlash from hardliners.

Pezeshkian said Iran was prepared to reduce its level of uranium enrichment, dilute its existing stockpile of uranium enriched to 60% and allow international verification as part of efforts to ease tensions over its nuclear program.

He also said Tehran wanted a possible agreement before the US midterm elections in November and denied that Iran had a plan to assassinate US President Donald Trump.

The contrasting reactions underscored a problem confronting Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi: declarations of defiance can command broad support within Iran’s political establishment, but the concessions involved in actually reaching an agreement with Washington are proving considerably more contentious.

“Mr. Pezeshkian, don't spout nonsense about nuclear matters and uranium!” wrote hardline activist Mohammad-Hossein Chavoshi.

“We supported you when you spoke the truth, and we'll do it again; but if you step out of line, we'll deal with you accordingly. We will not give up the nuclear issue.”

But some defended Pezeshkian’s position.

“Did he say we should abandon the nuclear program?” one user wrote. “He is talking about 60% enrichment. Should we have constant war, remain under siege and have no money?

“Go to a large pharmacy and see what the shortage of medicine is like, not to mention the state of businesses and the market. Nobody is saying we should surrender. We can move forward thoughtfully.”

Araghchi’s plan

The backlash has not been confined to Pezeshkian. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has faced sustained attacks from hardliners since presenting an Iranian proposal to the US through intermediaries on Tuesday.

The proposal sets out a phased, one-week process for implementing commitments, after which direct or indirect talks on a broader agreement could resume, according to Araghchi.

He said at a press conference on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly that Iran was ready to begin implementing the plan as soon as Washington agreed to it and that negotiations on the nuclear issue would resume after the Strait of Hormuz was reopened at the end of the seventh day.

According to Araghchi, one of the conditions is US agreement on a maritime passage arrangement through the Strait of Hormuz that has been agreed between Iran and Oman.

Although Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, confirmed in a television interview on Saturday that Araghchi had been authorized to convey Iran’s conditions to the US through intermediaries in New York, criticism of the foreign minister has continued.

On Wednesday, hardline parliamentarian Amir-Hossein Sabeti said he had registered an impeachment motion against Araghchi through parliament’s system.

Warnings of wider conflict

At the same time, political and military figures have stepped up warnings of escalation if US pressure continues.

Ahmad Alamolhoda, the Friday prayer leader in Mashhad, said Friday that Iran had new weapons that would be used in the event of another US attack. He said Iran could expand the geographical range of attacks against US forces as far as the Indian Ocean.

IRGC spokesman Hossein Mohebbi similarly said Iran was prepared to enter new stages of confrontation with the US and could respond to another attack by “changing the geography of the conflict, using new equipment and weapons, and selecting different targets.”

The warnings have increasingly extended to neighboring countries as restrictions on Iranian aviation have tightened. Iranian flights to Najaf, Iraq, were cancelled Friday, further narrowing the country’s remaining international connections.

Rezaei warned regional countries earlier this week that if they barred Iranian flights in cooperation with Washington, flights from their own airports could also be stopped.

Mohammad Mokhber, an adviser and aide to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, sharpened that warning Friday.

“Flights in the region are either free for everyone or for no one,” he wrote on X. “If Iran is unable to fly and receive airport services, no country in the region will have this possibility either.”

The competing messages highlight the difficulty facing Tehran as contacts with Washington resume: Pezeshkian and Araghchi are outlining the concessions and sequencing that a negotiated settlement could require, while hardline political and security figures emphasize Iran’s ability to widen the confrontation.

IRGC outlet rebukes Iran VP over Saudi National Day celebration

Sep 25, 2026, 20:17 GMT+1
100%

The IRGC-affiliated Fars News criticized Iran’s executive vice-president on Friday for joining Saudi officials in a cake-cutting ceremony marking the kingdom’s National Day in Tehran, which it said created an overly “friendly” image at a time of heightened regional tensions.

“Jafar has done it again,” Fars wrote, referring sarcastically to Mohammad Jafar Ghaempanah.

The issue, it said, was not Ghaempanah’s attendance at the event but what it described as the creation of an overly “friendly” image at a time of heightened tensions involving Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United States.

Ghaempanah later told state television that he had not been personally eager to attend the ceremony and had done so on instructions from officials responsible for Iran’s foreign policy.

“I had no motivation to attend the Saudi National Day ceremony, but I was instructed by the relevant foreign policy authorities to take part,” he said.

Ghaempanah added that during the event he condemned what he described as US attacks on Iran carried out from Saudi territory.

Fars said Iran and Saudi Arabia have diplomatic relations and that officials attending each other’s formal ceremonies was consistent with Tehran’s neighborhood policy.

But the outlet objected to images showing Ghaempanah standing alongside Saudi officials and holding hands with a Saudi representative during the cake-cutting ceremony, saying there was a distinction between “diplomatic presence” and producing “a friendly frame” under current conditions.

It pointed to the US naval blockade of Iran and reports of military cooperation between Washington and Riyadh against Iran-aligned groups in the region, arguing that symbolic gestures by senior Iranian officials would therefore face greater scrutiny.

Fars also linked the episode to earlier controversies surrounding Ghaempanah, saying a pattern had emerged in which remarks or actions by the vice president triggered criticism before he later explained that they had been misunderstood.

Ghaempanah previously drew criticism from hardliners after questioning the costs associated with Iran’s uranium enrichment program and arguing that policy should be assessed partly on a cost-benefit basis.

He later said those remarks were intended to argue for minimizing the costs of pursuing national objectives, rather than opposing uranium enrichment itself.

US and Iran want a deal, but neither wants to move first

Sep 25, 2026, 18:17 GMT+1
•
Behrouz Turani
100%
Participants ride motorcycles during a Janfada mobilisation rally in Tehran, beneath a billboard depicting a warrior emerging from the sea and confronting a burning ship, September 25, 2026

Talks between Iranian and US diplomats have continued in New York despite increasingly harsh rhetoric from both capitals, but the emerging dispute is less over whether to negotiate than over who must move first.

The discussions have increasingly focused on sequencing: Iran wants the United States to lift its economic blockade before Tehran reopens the Strait of Hormuz, while Washington is seeking movement on the strait before surrendering its principal source of leverage.

Neither side appears willing to go first despite the mounting economic and political costs of the deadlock.

On the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said in an interview with Fox News that Tehran was willing to relinquish its stockpile of uranium enriched to 60% within the framework of international law and its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The choice of Fox News may also have reflected an effort to reach President Donald Trump and his political audience more directly, given the network’s close relationship with the president.

Pezeshkian also said Tehran hoped to revive its June ceasefire understanding with Washington before the US midterm elections in November.

“We don't want it to get to the midterm elections,” he told reporters.

Trump has suggested the opposite timetable, saying in his UN General Assembly address that an agreement with Iran would likely be reached after the elections.

Who moves first?

Although both sides insist they seek peace, they remain divided over how an agreement would be implemented and in what order each should make concessions.

Tehran insists that no agreement can be reached before the United States lifts its economic blockade, while Washington and its European allies favour the opposite approach.

The disagreement is compounded by the collapse of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding.

From Tehran’s perspective, returning to an agreement that Washington previously failed to honour requires guarantees upfront. From Washington’s perspective, reviving the June arrangement risks appearing to reward Iran for using the Strait of Hormuz as leverage.

Supporters of diplomacy on both sides, along with mediators including Pakistan and Qatar, continue to urge the replacement of military rhetoric with political dialogue.

The problem is that each side is making a different calculation about timing and sequencing, while political considerations discourage either from moving first.

Iran’s demand that “all fronts” be addressed further complicates the equation, linking any agreement to Israel’s actions in Lebanon and elsewhere, while the widening confrontation in the Red Sea and around Bab el-Mandeb has added another layer of uncertainty to negotiations.

The midterms

The competing timetables reveal another dimension of the deadlock: both capitals have now openly linked a potential agreement to the November elections, but appear to be drawing opposite conclusions about who benefits from waiting.

It remains unclear whether Pezeshkian’s remarks will materially alter the course of negotiations. For now, each side appears to calculate that time is placing greater pressure on the other.

Trump’s threat to “annihilate Iran” raises the domestic political cost for Tehran of making concessions and increases the risk that any flexibility will be portrayed by Pezeshkian’s hardline opponents as capitulation.

Washington has political constraints of its own, with congressional hawks and influential regional lobbying groups likely to raise the political cost of concessions to Tehran ahead of the midterm elections.

The view from Tehran

The reformist daily Sharq argued on Thursday that the resumption of contacts offered an opportunity to prevent further escalation, but that significant differences between the two governments and political opposition at home made an immediate breakthrough unlikely.

“The mere continuation of mediation, or even a direct meeting between the presidents of Iran and the United States, lacks the capacity to overcome the current deadlock,” it said. “Changing this situation requires practical and reciprocal decisions from both Tehran and Washington that go beyond diplomatic messaging.”

That assessment points to the constraints facing Pezeshkian, including opposition from hardline parliamentary factions and Iran’s powerful security establishment.

For Iran’s leadership, the principal risk of an agreement is surrendering strategic leverage without guaranteed sanctions relief. For the Trump administration, moving first could expose it to accusations of appeasement ahead of the midterm elections.

The contacts in New York therefore suggest that diplomacy itself is not the missing ingredient. The harder question is whether either side is prepared to move first — and accept the political cost of doing so.

Iran threatens regional air travel as US sanctions cut its flight links

Sep 25, 2026, 12:25 GMT+1
100%
An Iranian passenger carrying luggage leaves Najaf International Airport after arriving on an AVA Airlines flight, in Najaf, Iraq, September 23, 2026.

Iran threatened to disrupt regional air travel if its airlines lose access to flights and airport services, as Iraq's Najaf, Erbil and Sulaimaniya joined other destinations restricting Iranian connections under mounting US sanctions pressure.

“If Iran cannot fly and receive airport services, no country in the region will have that possibility either,” supreme leader adviser Mohammad Mokhber wrote in a post on Friday. He did not explain how Tehran would enforce the threat.

His remarks echoed Supreme National Security Council secretary Mohsen Rezaei, who warned Wednesday that neighboring airports would be unable to operate if they cooperated with Washington’s campaign. Rezaei also warned neighboring countries against joining further US military action.

Airports in Najaf, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah have suspended flights to and from Iran, further narrowing air links with Iraq following restrictions at Baghdad airport. Najaf’s suspension took effect at 2 a.m. Friday until further notice, closing an alternative Iranian authorities had considered for diverted Baghdad-bound services.

  • Flying to or from Iran? What to know as US pressure squeezes air links

    Flying to or from Iran? What to know as US pressure squeezes air links

  • Iran warns it would disrupt regional airports if its flights are barred

    Iran warns it would disrupt regional airports if its flights are barred

Flights to Baghdad and Muscat were canceled on September 23. Iraqi aviation sources told Reuters that Baghdad’s suspension followed government instructions; Iranian aviation spokesman Majid Akhavan said Tehran was discussing Muscat’s restrictions with Oman.

The UAE suspended Iranian airlines’ flights Thursday, explicitly citing US sanctions. Azerbaijan halted services by Iranian carriers Tuesday, while affected airlines stopped flying to Georgia from September 21.

A Tehran-Dushanbe flight also turned back Thursday after Turkmenistan denied permission to cross its airspace. Mahan Air suspended Turkey and Oman services; travel agencies said it had lost ground-handling access in Turkey.

Washington sanctioned 36 aviation-related targets on September 8, including 27 carriers it described as Iran’s remaining unsanctioned airlines and three Turkey-based companies accused of serving Mahan. Treasury says Iranian aviation networks transport weapons, military personnel and illicit cargo.

  • Iran cancels Baghdad, Muscat flights as regional restrictions tighten

    Iran cancels Baghdad, Muscat flights as regional restrictions tighten

  • UAE says it suspended Iranian airline flights over US sanctions

    UAE says it suspended Iranian airline flights over US sanctions

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent warned that foreign airports, fuel suppliers, ground handlers and ticket sellers servicing sanctioned carriers risked US penalties, including exclusion from the dollar system. He said Iranian airlines would effectively lose international operations from September 23.

Those measures do not automatically close foreign airspace. Their effect depends on governments and service providers, and some flights continued. Bloomberg reported at least six departures Wednesday to destinations including Bangkok, Phuket, Shanghai and Kabul.

Foreign carriers have separately withdrawn services. Turkish Airlines told Iran International it had no Iran flights scheduled before March 2027, with no guaranteed restart. Earlier Iranian announcements of continuing Istanbul flights referred to other carriers.

Emirates no longer serves Tehran. Lufthansa and Austrian suspended Iran flights through October 24, while Qatar Airways cited airspace restrictions and tentatively listed November 29 for resumption. Those dates remain uncertain.

Four travel agencies contacted September 21 reported unavailable services across several other routes. Some Pegasus bookings were subsequently canceled, although booking-platform listings were not guarantees of operation.

The disruption affects family visits, business and pilgrimage to Najaf and Karbala. Agencies described travelers flying to Turkey, then taking roughly 17 hours by bus to Van and another 16–17 hours onward to Tehran, excluding border delays.

The UAE also barred Bank Melli branches from Iran-related transactions Wednesday, including trade finance and transfers.

  • China shipments help sustain Iran’s weapons programs despite US pressure - WSJ

    China shipments help sustain Iran’s weapons programs despite US pressure - WSJ

Rezaei linked the aviation warning to Tehran’s broader negotiating position, giving Washington four to five days to accept conditions already sent to mediators before talks or Hormuz’s reopening. He did not list them, saying Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi would convey them again in New York, and presented control of the strait as negotiating leverage.