Iran parliament advances controversial bill that could criminalize foreign contacts

Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and the Supreme Leader’s representative on the body, said Sunday that Tehran would consider any country participating in or supporting the US economic campaign against Iran to have committed an act of war.

“If the economic war continues, not a single drop of oil will be exported, neither through the Strait of Hormuz nor from anywhere in the Persian Gulf,” he wrote on X.

But the sweeping statements have raised a more fundamental question: Is Rezaei articulating Iran’s security policy, the Supreme Leader’s position or his own?

The question has become particularly significant because Rezaei’s increasingly confrontational rhetoric comes as President Masoud Pezeshkian and Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf have struck a markedly different tone.

Pezeshkian said Friday it would be better to end the war while Iran remains in a position of “power and dignity,” while Ghalibaf warned that “no matter how much military power we have, we won't survive if people are hungry.”

‘Secretary or president’?

Hardliners have seized on the contrast.

The hardline Hamshahri newspaper praised Rezaei on Monday for offering an alternative to what it called the language of “weakness and surrender” from other officials.

His approach, it said, was “neither a denial of economic pressure nor merely an attempt to neutralize sanctions, but to make the siege costly for its designers and supporters.”

“From this perspective, with Rezaei’s remarks, Iran’s economic doctrine has become militarized,” Hamshahri said.

Reformists, however, have questioned whether the SNSC secretary has the authority to articulate such policies without a formal council decision.

They argue that the secretary administers and communicates the council’s decisions rather than independently determining them, while Pezeshkian serves as president of the SNSC.

Former reformist lawmaker Mahmoud Sadeghi addressed Rezaei directly on X: “The seat you are sitting on is the secretaryship of the Supreme National Security Council, not the presidency.”

The nuclear question

The disagreement is particularly consequential because Rezaei has gone beyond the immediate economic confrontation to raise the possibility of reconsidering Iran’s longstanding rejection of nuclear weapons.

In an interview broadcast on state television, he argued that US attacks had demonstrated that neither membership in the Non-Proliferation Treaty nor cooperation with international nuclear inspectors could protect a country from military attack.

“When America is waging such a war, people naturally ask: Why shouldn’t we pursue nuclear weapons ourselves?” Rezaei said.

He went further, arguing that a nuclear weapon could be “cheaper and more effective than having hundreds of F-35s and spending enormous amounts of money on other military capabilities.”

Rezaei stopped short of saying Iran had decided to pursue a bomb. But some hardliners interpreted his remarks as an invitation to reconsider Iran’s nuclear doctrine.

“I hope this accurate and correct analysis by General Rezaei will be a prelude to Iran’s withdrawal from the NPT and a change in Iran’s nuclear doctrine,” hardline journalist Nezameddin Mousavi wrote.

Hamshahri similarly said Rezaei had raised the question of an atomic bomb without explicitly presenting it as Iran’s official position.

‘Solution out of reach’

Abdollah Ramezanzadeh, spokesman for former reformist President Mohammad Khatami, countered that the responsibilities of the SNSC chairman, secretary, members and Supreme Leader’s representatives are separately defined.

The secretary’s job, he argued, is to prepare meetings and communicate decisions under the chairman’s supervision.

Hardliners reject that interpretation, pointing to Rezaei’s second position as the Supreme Leader’s representative on the council.

Rezaei served as the Leader’s military adviser during the war before being appointed his representative on the SNSC, alongside his appointment as secretary by Pezeshkian.

His supporters argue that the dual role gives his statements greater political weight than those of an ordinary council secretary. Some have gone further, portraying criticism of Rezaei as an attack on the Supreme Leader himself.

Conservative journalist Ehsan Salehi, meanwhile, portrayed Rezaei’s statements as part of a deliberate escalation strategy in which each new stage of US pressure produces a tougher Iranian response.

“Each new stage of pressure and tension makes Iran’s behavior more complicated and tougher and puts a solution further out of reach,” Salehi wrote.

The dispute comes as Iran confronts increasingly severe economic pressure and an unresolved military standoff with the United States—and is no longer simply over tactics.

With Rezaei threatening oil exports across the Persian Gulf and openly questioning the logic of remaining non-nuclear, it has become an argument over who has the authority to signal how far Iran is prepared to go.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has described the campaign as the “endgame,” while Iran’s Central Bank Governor Abdolnasser Hemmati insisted it would have “no impact on Iran.”

Other senior officials have warned regional and European states against helping Washington enforce its measures.

But Abdolrahman Fathollahi, an analyst writing in Shargh, cautioned against assuming that decades of experience circumventing sanctions mean Tehran can simply weather the latest campaign.

Iran, he said, is now more economically fragile after the recent conflicts known as the 12-day and 40-day wars. The new measures are designed not simply to add restrictions but to close Iran’s remaining economic lifelines—and test how far China is prepared to go to keep them open.

That could prove crucial.

Hamed Vafaei, an associate professor of Chinese studies at the University of Tehran, argues that Beijing is likely to maintain enough oil purchases and trade to prevent Iran’s complete economic isolation, but will not sacrifice its own interests to rescue Tehran.

China’s economic relationships with the United States, Western markets and Persian Gulf Arab states dwarf its trade with Iran. Vafaei said Tehran should therefore view Beijing as a pragmatic strategic partner rather than an unconditional ally.

International affairs analyst Esmail Beshari similarly told Shargh that tougher US sanctions would create additional obstacles but were unlikely to sever Iran-China trade altogether.

Some Iranian analysts have urged Tehran to move beyond what they describe as a “North Korea model” of relying on China for basic economic survival toward a “Pakistan model” based on deeper, mutually beneficial trade and investment.

The warnings come as pressure on Iran’s domestic economy is already mounting. Annual inflation reached 66 percent in July and food prices were 128 percent higher than a year earlier, according to official data, while gasoline supplies have also come under strain.

Iranian economic newspapers have cautioned against complacency. Donya-ye Eghtesad warned that relying on methods used to circumvent previous sanctions could prove a mistake, arguing that Tehran must also address its domestic vulnerabilities.

Concern about those vulnerabilities is increasingly visible within the security establishment.

Police chief Ahmadreza Radan said foreign powers were preparing to exploit economic hardship to foment unrest. President Masoud Pezeshkian has said it would be better to end the war while Iran remains in a position of “power and dignity.”

Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf was blunter.

“No matter how much military power we have, we won't survive if people are hungry and we don't have financial turnover, economic growth and national production,” he said.

Such warnings sit uneasily alongside Tehran’s public insistence that Washington’s latest campaign will fail.

Iran has survived decades of sanctions and analysts do not expect the new measures to completely sever its economic links with China. But keeping some trade and oil exports flowing is not the same as insulating an economy already weakened by war from further pressure.

The question for Tehran may therefore be not whether “Economic D-Day” can completely isolate Iran, but how much additional pressure the country can absorb.

Images, videos and accounts posted widely on Persian-language social media showed closed stations and lines of cars at others still operating, with shortages reported in several parts of the capital, including central and northern Tehran.

The disruption was also acknowledged by state-affiliated media.

“Some gas stations have closed without a clear explanation, creating considerable concern and questions for people,” SSN wrote, calling on the government to explain whether the closures were part of an attempt to curb fuel consumption and how long they would last.

The shortages bring into the open a problem Iranian officials have been warning about for months: the country is consuming more gasoline than it can produce.

Reza Sepahvand, spokesperson for parliament’s Energy Committee, said this month that Iran was producing about 130 million liters of gasoline a day while consuming around 137 million liters, leaving a daily shortfall of about seven million liters.

Sepahvand also said gasoline imports had stopped under the US naval blockade, removing one of the ways Tehran had previously made up the difference between domestic production and demand.

Other official estimates have put the deficit even higher. Mohammad Jafar Ghaempanah, President Masoud Pezeshkian’s executive deputy, said this month that Iran faced a gasoline imbalance of around 14 million liters a day.

The government is therefore confronting an increasingly difficult choice: finding ways to reduce consumption without sharply raising the price motorists pay at the pump.

Iran has for years sold heavily subsidized gasoline, contributing to high consumption and imposing a growing burden on state finances. Pezeshkian himself has questioned the logic of buying fuel at international prices while selling it domestically at a fraction of the cost.

But attempts to raise gasoline prices carry considerable political risk.

A sudden increase in November 2019 triggered nationwide protests that quickly expanded into broader demonstrations against the Islamic Republic. Security forces responded with a deadly crackdown and a near-total internet shutdown.

The memory of those protests has made gasoline prices one of the most politically sensitive economic issues facing successive Iranian governments.

Officials have instead discussed alternatives including changes to fuel quotas, limiting subsidized gasoline and charging higher prices for consumption above allocated amounts.

But uncertainty over those plans has itself contributed to anxiety among motorists, with long queues reported at filling stations in recent days.

The supply squeeze comes as Iran faces a broader deterioration in economic conditions following months of war and sanctions.

Washington on Monday expanded its campaign of secondary sanctions against Tehran as part of what US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has called an “economic D-Day” intended to sever Iran’s remaining economic lifelines.

For motorists in Tehran, however, the consequences are increasingly immediate.

Social media reports on Monday described people visiting several stations before finding gasoline, waiting for hours in the summer heat and arriving at pumps only to find supplies exhausted.

The closures have also fueled speculation that restricting supply may itself be emerging as a way of forcing down consumption without announcing a politically dangerous price increase.

There has been no official announcement that the government has adopted such a policy.

More than 12,000 people also commented on the poll, with financial pressure, job insecurity, housing costs and concerns about children’s futures emerging repeatedly among the reasons given for putting off marriage or parenthood.

Some respondents said they wanted to marry or have children but lacked the financial or social conditions to do so. Others pointed to divorce and unsuccessful marriages as reasons for avoiding marriage.

Men accounted for 68% of respondents and women for 32%. The largest age group was 25 to 34, representing 40.3% of participants, followed by people aged 35 to 44 at 29.2%.

• 

  Continued decline in Iran's marriage rates despite Supreme Leader's growth push

Respondents aged 18 to 24 made up 13.3%, while those aged 45 to 54 accounted for 9.8%.

Economic pressures weigh on family plans

Many respondents linked their reluctance to start families to the cost of everyday life, according to an examination of comments submitted with the poll.

Some wrote that meeting their own expenses had become difficult enough and that supporting a spouse or child was beyond their financial means. Others said they remained interested in marriage or parenthood but could not afford either.

Iran has faced years of high inflation and a steep decline in the value of its currency, eroding household purchasing power and making housing and other basic costs harder to meet.

The economic strain has been compounded by international sanctions and government policies at home and abroad, with their contribution to Iran’s economic problems a subject of continuing political debate.

Personal experiences of divorce and unsuccessful marriages also appeared repeatedly in the responses. Some participants described marriage under present conditions as a “high-risk decision.”

100%

Others who were already married said they had decided against having children because of economic and social conditions. Respondents also cited mistrust and difficulty finding a suitable partner.

A smaller number expressed support for marriage or having children.

Parents question children's prospects

Concerns about the conditions in which children would grow up formed another major strand of the responses.

Some said they wanted children but were unwilling to bring them into a society where they feared they could face poverty, inflation, electricity shortages, insecurity and an uncertain future.

A number used much stronger language, describing having children under present circumstances as a “crime” or a “betrayal” of the child because parents could not guarantee an adequate quality of life or future.

Iran faces severe environmental challenges including air pollution, groundwater depletion, forest fires and wider ecosystem degradation. Experts have linked such problems to a combination of poor policymaking, weak environmental protections, corruption and insufficient resources.

Political outlook feeds pessimism

Some respondents connected their decisions directly to Iran’s political and social conditions and their expectations for the country’s future.

Years of economic hardship have coincided with repeated waves of anti-government protests and deadly crackdowns, alongside restrictions on political and social freedoms.

• 

  Sex work blessed by religion: Inside Iran’s temporary marriage network

For some participants, those pressures appeared to have turned decisions about marriage and parenthood into a broader judgment about what kind of future is possible in Iran.

The scale and substance of the responses point to a question facing many of them: not simply whether they can afford to build families, but whether they see a future in which they want to do so.

The roughly three-minute report focuses on Barron Trump and portrays attempts to identify ways of reaching him, using stylized graphics depicting surveillance, online activity and people in his surroundings.

The segment displays locations and online platforms purportedly associated with the effort and depicts attempts to map social connections around the president’s son and penetrate layers of Secret Service protection.

Iran International could not independently verify the operational claims made in the broadcast, which relies heavily on dramatized graphics and provides no evidence that any attempt to reach Barron Trump has succeeded.

But the decision to air such material on Iranian state television is significant in itself. Threats against Trump and other current and former US officials have featured for years in Iranian political rhetoric, state-linked media and rallies, alongside alleged assassination plots that US authorities have attributed to Tehran.

Similar videos have been broadcast before targeting Trump and his wife, Melania.

US prosecutors have previously accused members or associates of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards of plotting to kill former senior American officials, including former national security adviser John Bolton, in retaliation for the 2020 US killing of Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani.

Trump himself has also been the subject of alleged Iranian assassination plots. US prosecutors said in 2024 that Tehran had tasked an operative with developing a plan to kill him, while Iranian threats have contributed to heightened security around the president.

Such rhetoric has intensified dramatically since the war began on February 28, when US-Israeli strikes killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other senior Iranian military and political figures.

Calls for revenge have since become a prominent feature of hardline messaging. Hundreds of thousands attending Khamenei’s funeral chanted against the United States and Israel, while some hardliners openly called for Trump’s assassination.

The latest broadcast marks a potentially significant escalation in that rhetoric by shifting the focus from Trump and US officials directly involved in policy toward Iran to the president’s family.

Toward the end of the segment, the narrator asserts “many would be willing” to take the $10 million reward connected to efforts targeting Barron Trump.