With negotiations now hanging in the balance, conflicting signals from Tehran have reinforced a familiar pattern: internal rivalries routinely overwhelm coherence at moments requiring discipline.
On Wednesday, Axios reported that the planned talks were no longer expected to go ahead, while Israel’s Channel 12 went further, citing officials as saying the process had been cancelled altogether.
Iranian and US officials have not publicly confirmed that account, but the drift has been unmistakable.
The unraveling followed days of public discord inside Iran’s political establishment.
After President Masoud Pezeshkian said he had “ordered” Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to travel to Turkey to discuss arrangements for talks, ultraconservative MP Amir Hossein Sabeti attacked the move in a post on X.
“Mr. Araghchi, our people are waiting for a pre-emptive action against the enemy, not negotiations. And you got up and went to Turkey?!”
The remarks ignored—or deliberately blurred—the fact that decisions on negotiations with the United States rest with the Supreme Leader, not the president. They also illustrated how calls for escalation are often deployed less as strategy than as factional positioning, regardless of the risks such rhetoric may invite.
A second episode followed when ultraconservative MP Hamid Rasai targeted Vice President Jafar Ghaempanah over an X post responding to Pezeshkian’s message about Araghchi’s trip.
After Ghaempanah wrote, “No war is good, and no peace necessarily means surrender,” Rasai questioned his loyalty and invoked his U.S.-based son, escalating the attack with religious language.
Such exchanges are not aberrations. Factional conflict has been embedded in the Islamic Republic since its inception.
Early struggles between Islamic liberals and religious fundamentalists gave way to rivalries among clerical factions, later morphing into competition between reformists and conservatives, and, since the mid-2000s, a sharper divide between hardliners and moderates.
For years, the Supreme Leader functioned as a broker among these camps, preserving a degree of political coherence. As power has become more centralized and alignments more rigid, that balancing role has weakened.
Vested interests across the system have repeatedly shown a willingness to obstruct—and at times actively sabotage—diplomatic processes rather than allow rivals to claim credit for engagement with Washington.
As many commentators, including former President Hassan Rouhani, have long observed, the fiercest resistance to talks has often come not from principled opposition to diplomacy itself, but from fear of who might benefit politically if diplomacy succeeds.
The result is a recurring pattern in which negotiations collapse not only under external pressure, but under the weight of Iran’s own internal rivalries.
