Iran will 'pull the trigger,' warns hardline Tehran newspaper

“Iran’s persistent efforts to track and monitor regime opponents through cyberspace present a growing cyber security challenge for Canada and our allies,” the report says.

Iran has become a player in global cyber warfare, conducting increasingly sophisticated attacks on regional and international targets. Iranian cyber capabilities have evolved over the past decade, with state-sponsored groups targeting a variety of sectors, including government, finance, energy, and media.

Canada’s 2025 National Cyber Threat Assessment lists Iran, alongside Russia and China, as a primary cyber threat to national security, warning that Iran’s digital reach now extends beyond the Middle East to target Western nations.

As per the assessment, Iran has used its ongoing cyber clashes with Israel to strengthen its espionage and offensive cyber tactics, which it now deploys against Western targets.

Canadian intelligence officials say that while Canada may not be a primary focus of Iran’s cyber activities, Iranian actors “likely have access to computer networks in Canada, including critical infrastructure.”

According to the statement, the Iranian actors have used high-profile events, like the downing of Flight PS752 over Tehran, as themes in phishing campaigns aimed at the Iranian diaspora and Canadian officials. These campaigns have targeted key sectors, including aerospace, defense, and telecommunications, in pursuit of Iran’s intelligence-gathering objectives.

In just the past few weeks, major tech companies Google, Microsoft, and Meta have all reported malicious activities linked to Iran, warning that Iranian efforts could escalate, potentially inciting violence against political figures to sow chaos and compromise the integrity of the upcoming elections in the US.

Microsoft Threat Analysis Center (MTAC) research related to the US elections released last week said Iran is gearing up for additional influence operations.

“Iranian groups tasked with targeting the US elections may make an effort—as they have in the past—to run influence operations both shortly before and soon after the election by leveraging cyber intrusions from weeks to months prior,” the report said.

On October 14, a report revealed that MTAC's investigation identified an online persona, controlled by Iran, pretending to be an American and urging Americans to boycott the elections over both candidates' support for Israel’s military actions.

In response, a spokesperson for Iran's mission to the United Nations denied any Iranian interference in the US presidential elections. "These allegations are entirely baseless and utterly unacceptable," the spokesperson stated.

As Iran’s cyber capabilities and global reach expand, Canada and its allies face an increasingly complex challenge in countering Tehran’s disruptive and coercive cyber strategies.

"During initial 60-day implementation period, Lebanon will dismantle and confiscate all military assets, arms, and infrastructure of all non-state armed groups south of the line (of the Litani River)," the document said.

The White House in a statement neither confirmed nor denied the authenticity of the document.

"There are many reports and drafts circulating. They do not reflect the current state of negotiations," it said.

The origin and author of the printed document stamped "DRAFT" and subtitled "for discussion only" was not immediately clear and none of the other relevant parties have yet commented on its authenticity. It was dated October 26.

The period of calm would start with a 60-day ceasefire and envisions 10,000 Lebanese soldiers eventually deploying to the rugged Lebanese region from which Hezbollah draws much of its support and has been heavily bombed and invaded by Israeli forces.

UN Resolution 1701, a 2006 international agreement by which Hezbollah would be largely replaced and checked by UN forces, would be the basis of the ceasefire according to the document.

Hezbollah's new leader Naim Qassem said on Wednesday that the group would agree to a ceasefire under certain unspecified conditions if Israel wanted to stop the war, but that Israel had so far not agreed to any proposal that could be discussed.

Lebanon's health ministry has said 2,822 people have been killed in Israel's military campaign in Lebanon since October 2023 and more than 1.2 million people have been displaced.

Around 60,000 Israelis have been displaced by nearly a year of fighting near northern border areas and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has made returning them safely to their homes a main war goal.

Iran’s ongoing conflict with Israel has led to calls for weaponization of the country’s nuclear program, first from hardline commentators, then MPs, then top advisors.

Khamenei has so far resisted all such calls publicly. His rejection of weapons of mass killing on religious grounds is regularly cited by Iranian officials as proof that Iran’s nuclear activities are peaceful and cannot be otherwise.

Given Khamenei’s official stance, most comments by Iranian officials to date have been read as posturing. However, some recent publications by the group, the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations (SCFR), may suggest a meaningful shift in Iran’s defense doctrine.

Khamenei established the SCFR in 2006 as an advisory body to assist his office in the development of foreign policy and strategic planning. Due to the Islamic Republic’s opaque workings Khamenei’s decision-making is difficult to parse, but it is clear that informal bodies like the SCFR have become increasingly significant in this process.

Since Iran’s missile attack against Israel on October 1, the SCFR has released multiple publications regarding the nuclear issue. This includes two interviews discussing how Russia and China’s nuclear doctrines have become more aggressive in response to recent actions by the United States and its allies. Both highlight the importance of nuclear weapons in enhancing deterrence capability, drawing evident parallels with Iran’s position vis-à-vis Israel.

Another paper outlines the strategic rationale behind Iran’s missile attack against Israel. It highlights Iran’s willingness to do more to deter Israel, warning that future responses would be harsher. These publications follow more explicit calls by the SCFR for Iran to reconsider its nuclear doctrine in recent months.

"It is only natural for Iran---as a nation facing threats and unilaterally bearing all the costs of alleviating Western countries’ “nuclear concerns” without reaping any economic or security benefit---to pose fundamental questions about the pertinence and sagacity of its current nuclear and defense doctrine," an article on the SCFR website reads.

Groundwork for a shift

Such statements may not bear the supreme leader’s seal, but precedent suggests that they can be the groundwork for an eventual shift in Khamenei’s position, indicating that his advisors’ recent comments may be more than mere posturing.

Over the past several years, the advisory body has established itself as a sounding board for changes in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic.

SCFR publications frequently anticipate public decisions by the supreme leader and other state officials – indicating that Khamenei may first convey his intentions to the SCFR for deliberation.

One example of this is a 2020 publication signaling support for closer strategic cooperation with Russia, prior to Iran’s accession into the Shanghai Cooperative Organization, support for the invasion of Ukraine, and the recently completed bilateral security agreement.

Another example is Iran’s adoption of sanctions relief and resumed negotiations with Western states as key foreign policy objectives under the presidency of Masoud Pezeshkian.

Before his term, the Islamic Republic appeared less interested in these efforts, as Khamenei prioritized the development of a “resistance economy” to counter the pressure of international sanctions.

As early as 2023, the SCFR promoted pursuit of sanctions relief as part of the agenda for Iran’s foreign policy in 2024, moving away from the “resistance economy” approach. In the lead up to Iran’s 2024 election, the SCFR released additional statements engaging with the subject. Since taking office, Pezeshkian has pursued these objectives with Khamenei’s tacit support.

Altogether, recent SCFR publications mark a change in tone from the advisory body’s earlier insistence that Iran is a responsible actor on the issue of nuclear proliferation, in line with Khamenei’s rhetoric, to one of more nuclear risk-readiness.

This brings concerning implications, especially in the context of Iran’s efforts to increase its stockpile of enriched uranium earlier this year.

In recent years, Khamenei has used the SCFR to extend a lifeline to politically isolated figures, deepen ties with ascendent officials, and keep policymakers under his personal influence.

This is demonstrated by the recent appointment of former SCFR secretary Abbas Araghchi as Foreign Minister, and his replacement by Ali Baqeri Kani, a prominent member of Ebrahim Raisi’s presidential administration. Khamenei has also increasingly relied upon the SCFR as an instrument for personal diplomacy—particularly in maintaining ties with the leaders of Iran’s armed allies in the region.

As Iran and Israel draw ever closer to a full-scale war, the SCFR’s recent publications may suggest that the Islamic Republic will continue to weigh the option of amending its nuclear doctrine.

This course will also be influenced by the expected implementation of a security agreement with Russia, which may enhance Tehran’s confidence.

Should the Iranian nuclear program be openly weaponized, the Islamic Republic will be further emboldened in its efforts to destabilize the region, support Russia’s war in Ukraine, and challenge U.S. interests.

It would also bring a significant risk of further proliferation, particularly as the regime formalizes the Axis of Resistance through a codified alliance structure.

This marks a shift from earlier efforts to downplay the significance of Israel’s operation and may reflect Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s directive to "neither downplay nor exaggerate the impact of the attack."

Meanwhile, Khamenei stated that it was up to other officials to determine how to respond to Israel. Several observers, including Iran International political analyst Morad Veisi, interpreted this as a sign that Khamenei was once again attempting to sidestep responsibility for a potential conflict with Israel.

In a Tuesday report, the pro-reform website Rouydad24 website in Tehran stated that Saturday’s attack has effectively ended the shadow war between Iran and Israel, raising the question of whether Iran is now prepared for open conflict.

The website quoted Mohammad Khajoui the director of the Lebanese Studies Group at the Middle East Strategic Studies affiliated with the Iranian Foreign Ministry as saying that it is still too early to answer that question.

The website noted that while some argue the attack inflicted significant losses on Iran, others see it as a mere show by Israel. Regardless, Rouydad24 asserted that both Iran and Israel now face an unprecedented situation, with the outcome still uncertain. It suggested that the direction forward may ultimately be influenced by the results of the U.S. election and any potential cease-fire in Gaza and Lebanon.

Khajoui argued that both sides will try to magnify the importance of their own initiatives and to downplay the actions of the other side. This, he said, makes an accurate assessment of the situation difficult.

The Middle East expert explained that since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iranian politicians have been divided on how to approach Israel. One faction, driven by ideological beliefs, advocates for Israel’s elimination, while another believes that, as a Western-backed state, Israel could be controlled rather than destroyed. Ultimately, Iran’s political system settled on a strategy of empowering anti-Israel groups in the region rather than directly engaging in attacks against Israel.

Iran openly supported anti-Israeli groups, overlooking the fragile balance that risked escalating into full-scale war. Following Hamas’s October 7, 2023, incursion, Jerusalem sought to turn its setback into an advantage by weakening both Hamas and Hezbollah. However, as tensions escalated, Iran inched closer to direct involvement, leading to the current situation, Khajoui explained.

He added that Iran is unable to respond swiftly to Israel’s attack, placing Tehran in a difficult position as it was unprepared for the current situation. Meanwhile, all options available to Iran come at a high cost. Iran also recognizes that if it chooses inaction or steps back, Israel is likely to press forward. For now, Iran’s only viable approach is to await the outcome of the US election and a potential cease-fire in Gaza and Lebanon.

Meanwhile, Iranian lawmaker Fada Hossein Maleki informed reporters that Khamenei has entrusted the Iranian armed forces with decision-making on how to respond to Israel. However, as analyst Morad Veisi noted, “Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, frequently deflects responsibility on challenging decisions, issuing ambiguous statements that enable him to sidestep blame if things go wrong.”

Based on the Iranian Constitutional Law, the Supreme Leader is the sole authority to decide on matters of war and peace, and he knows better than anyone else that he is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. So, in fact, he is handing over decision-making to himself, but tries to evade responsibility and blame others if his decisions backfire.

Maleki, a member of the Iranian parliament's national security and foreign relations committee, stated that Iran’s response to Israel would be determined with “prudence.” This remark suggests that Tehran may not be able to reach a decision as swiftly as some in the press might anticipate.

"Iran supports our project and doesn't ask anything of us," Qassem said on Wednesday. "We don't fight on behalf of anyone or for anyone's project; we fight for Lebanon," he added.

The new Hezbollah leader also pledged that the group would continue its path of war with Israel, following the agenda set by his predecessor Hassan Nasrallah who was killed in an Israeli airstrike on the Lebanese capital in September.

"We will continue our war plan within the outlined political frameworks; we will remain on the path of war," he said.

Qassem, who had served as Hezbollah’s deputy leader since 1991, was elected by the group’s Shura Council. At 71, he is regarded as a foundational figure within Hezbollah.

Iranian leaders publicly extended their congratulations to Qassem on his appointment. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian commended his “defense of Lebanon’s sovereignty and ideals of the resistance front,” while Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf praised Qassem’s enduring commitment to Hezbollah’s mission in Lebanon and across the region.

Meanwhile, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant alluded to Qassem’s potential vulnerability, posting on X shortly after the appointment, “Temporary appointment. Not for long.” He added in Hebrew, “The countdown has begun.”

Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps founded Hezbollah in 1982 and has provided substantial arms and financial backing over the decades.

Although the scale of Iranian support has varied over the years, US officials estimated in 2018 that Iran channels approximately $700 million annually to Hezbollah.

Unconfirmed reports suggest that on October 5 Qassem was flown from Beirut to Tehran aboard an aircraft belonging to Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. While Iranian officials have yet to confirm these reports, Qassem’s potential relocation to Iran would imply that Hezbollah's leadership in Lebanon is now managed remotely.