How cabinets are shaped in the Islamic Republic

As newly elected President Masoud Pezeshkian formed his cabinet, the country’s Supreme Leader—widely recognized as the ultimate authority in Iran—made a vain effort to appear detached from the selection process.

"Mr. President also consulted with me, and I endorsed some of the individuals I was familiar with or whose competence was conveyed to us through reliable sources. I emphasized that certain individuals should definitely be in the cabinet, while for many others, I simply stated that I had no opinion," Ali Khamenei said after the selection process concluded.

On the other hand, Pezeshkian, in an effort to defend his ministerial choices, emphasized his coordination with Khamenei. As a result, the parliament voted in favor of all the proposed ministers, despite the fact that just the day before, the largest faction in the parliament—representing more than two-thirds of the votes—had announced it would not support four of the nominees.

"The Islamic Guidance Minister initially did not want to join; Sir [Khamenei] ordered him, and he came along. I don't want to say these things; why are you forcing me to? I don’t want to go into details, but I want to say that I coordinated [with Khamenei] before coming here. Sir [Khamenei] himself said that Mrs. Sadeq should be in the cabinet. All these esteemed individuals have joined with coordination and understanding," Pezeshkian said.

Two key questions arise, which can help clarify the process and structure of ministerial selection in the Islamic government: What are the legal and actual roles of the Islamic Republic’s Leader in choosing ministers? How does this role influence the selection process, and what are its consequences?

Extralegal interference

Iran's Guardian Jurist, known as the "Vali-ye Faqih" or "Supreme Leader," is the highest authority in the Islamic Republic of Iran. To understand the role of the Guardian Jurist in selecting ministers, examining the Constitution alone is insufficient. According to the Constitution, the president nominates ministers, and the parliament approves or rejects them.

However, in practice, real political power lies with the Guardian Jurist, whose authority is absolute, unrestrained, and unaccountable. If he does not approve of a ministerial candidate and that candidate is still introduced, he can create three specific political challenges in the face of that decision.

First, the Guardian Jurist or his office would signal to parliament members not to vote for the candidate. If they defy this signal, the Guardian Council could disqualify them from the next election or initiate a criminal case against them.

Second, the Guardian Jurist could employ parallel security agencies, such as the IRGC intelligence, to undermine the candidate or damage their reputation.

Lastly, he could interfere with or disrupt the candidate’s ability to perform their duties effectively.

During Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's first term as president in the early 1990s, Khamenei's influence over the cabinet was relatively limited, as he was still in the early years of his role as Supreme Leader following the death of Ruhollah Khomeini, who had wielded considerable power. However, by Rafsanjani's second term, Khamenei had begun to consolidate his authority and exerted more influence over the selection of key ministers, including those for Foreign Affairs, Intelligence, Islamic Guidance, and Defense.

Under Mohammad Khatami's administration (1997-2005), Khamenei, along with the institutions under his control, took steps to ensure that key ministries—such as Foreign Affairs, Justice, Intelligence, Islamic Guidance, and Defense—remained under their influence. After a series of assassinations of dissidents and writers by Intelligence Ministry agents, Khatami succeeded in appointing his own choice for the Intelligence Ministry. However, when it came to the Ministry of Interior, Khamenei intervened by directing the Majles (parliament) to impeach Khatami’s preferred candidate and install his own choice instead.

In Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's first term as president (2005-2009), he and Khamenei maintained a harmonious relationship with little to no tension. During his second term, however, a significant rift emerged between them over the appointment of the Minister of Intelligence, Haydar Moslehi. In protest of Khamenei's decision, Ahmadinejad refused to attend work for 11 days, but ultimately, Khamenei's choice prevailed. This rift persisted for the remainder of Ahmadinejad’s presidency.

Hassan Rouhani secured his position by accepting Khamenei's vetoes and influence over the selection of ministers, which helped maintain a tension-free relationship. In contrast, Ebrahim Raisi was so closely aligned with Khamenei that his ministerial choices naturally reflected the Supreme Leader's preferences. This level of coordination was so strong that Khamenei even instructed Pezeshkian to ensure that his cabinet continued to follow the path set by Raisi.

Through this approach, Khamenei has gradually taken over the power to veto or impose cabinet members on the president without being accountable for their performance. Previous presidents often concealed this reality to avoid embarrassment and conflict with Khamenei.

Pezeshkian openly exposing Khamenei's interference in the ministerial selection process, has sparked resentment among some of Khamenei's loyalists in media outlets like Kayhan Daily.

The President typically expects three things from his ministers: loyalty to him, alignment with parliamentary expectations (to avoid impeachment), and enough public support to secure votes for him and his political coalition.

In contrast, Khamenei demands only loyalty and obedience. His involvement in selecting ministers thus ensures his absolute authority, channels resources into his economic interests, and guarantees the strict implementation of his policies.

Implications of the selection process

In Iran, the selection process for high-ranking officials often leads to the appointment of individuals with certain common traits. These individuals often lack a specific policy plan and are prepared to make promises to stay in power. They are typically adept at pleasing those in power and skilled in hiding corruption and inefficiencies within the government.

Despite claims of prioritizing merit and expertise in the selection of ministers, the level of government expertise in Iran has thus steadily declined, and the principle of meritocracy has been disregarded.

Competent individuals never attain high-level positions such as ministers or members of parliament. When experts are appointed to lower-level roles, they are often dismissed swiftly.

In one rare example, Kaveh Madani, a distinguished environmental expert and former deputy of the Environmental Protection Organization, was removed from his position quickly despite his expertise.

Political cliques and entrenched factions are determined to uphold the influence of those who further their interests and reinforce their own power. As a result, inefficiency, lack of transparency, and corruption have increased, leading to a growing erosion of public trust in the state.