Iran planning to resume testing nuclear bomb detonators

Iran is intensifying efforts on its secretive nuclear weapons program, bringing the country closer than ever to developing a nuclear bomb—a threat that has loomed for over two decades, according to exclusive information obtained by Iran International.

According to three independent sources in Iran, who have chosen to remain anonymous due to the sensitive nature of the topic, the Islamic Republic is advancing its secret nuclear weapons program by restructuring the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), retaining Mohammad Eslami as the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and resuming tests to produce nuclear bomb detonators.

For years, US intelligence agencies consistently stated in their annual reports that Iran “isn’t currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons development activities necessary to produce a testable nuclear device". However, in the Director of National Intelligence’s 2024 report, released in July, that phrase was omitted. Instead, the report stated that Iran has “undertaken activities that better position it to produce a nuclear device, if it chooses to do so.”

The newly obtained information shows the Islamic Republic has intensified its efforts to complete the nuclear weapons production cycle, including high-level uranium enrichment, the production of nuclear detonation devices, and the development of missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads.
Restructuring SPND.

Less than a month before Ebrahim Raisi's death, the Iranian Parliament passed a bill to formalize the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) as an independent entity. Originally established in 2010 as a subsidiary of the Ministry of Defense, SPND was restructured under this new legislation, enacted just a week before Raisi's passing.
Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, a prominent figure in Iran's military nuclear program, previously led SPND.

Fakhrizadeh was assassinated in November 2020 near Tehran, an act attributed to Mossad. The new law has granted SPND financial independence, exempting it from the oversight of the National Audit Office, essentially allowing it to operate without accountability for its budget.

The law also states that SPND will be governed according to a statute issued by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. This restructuring of SPND is significant as it provides the organization with unique autonomy, allowing it to continue the legacy of Fakhrizadeh's work, particularly in producing nuclear detonation devices

SPND’s role in Iran’s nuclear program
On January 20, the Islamic Republic used a solid-fuel, three-stage satellite carrier named Qaem-100, developed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), to launch a satellite called Sorayya into orbit. The move drew condemnation from Germany, Britain, and France, who issued a joint statement claiming that the Qaem-100 missile uses long-range ballistic missile technology.

Since the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran has increased its uranium enrichment purity levels to 60% and has accumulated enough enriched uranium to potentially produce several nuclear bombs in a short period of time. The capability to build a nuclear weapon involves a complex cycle with three essential components: highly enriched uranium, the construction of a detonator, and the development of a delivery system capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.

Sources indicate that Tehran’s efforts to launch IRGC satellites are part of its plan to develop missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. SPND, on the other hand, continues to work on the production of another crucial component of Iran's nuclear program: the development of nuclear detonators. This project reportedly continued covertly under the guise of "Project 110" after the 2003 exposure of "Project Amad."

Documents reveal that after 2003, Tehran continued to work on neutron initiators for nuclear warheads at the Abadeh site, where previous detonator tests had been conducted. According to sources, SPND began a project named "Metfaz" at the Abadeh facility in 2011, involving one of the three key figures of Iran's current military nuclear program. The Islamic Republic had previously claimed that this program was halted.
A photo from 2018 shows that Tehran was testing the explosive detonators needed for nuclear warheads during the two years leading up to that date, a time when the JCPOA was still in effect.

Saeed Borji’s role
Saeed Borji, an explosives and metals expert from Malek Ashtar University, affiliated with the Ministry of Defense, has been instrumental in Tehran's nuclear weapons program. For a time, he operated under the guise of a company named Azar Afrouz Saeed Engineering Company, which claimed to manufacture spherical tanks for the petrochemical industry.

When Mossad stole Iran's nuclear documents in 2018, Tehran realized that the Abadeh site had been exposed and immediately demolished it, as satellite images confirm. According to exclusive information obtained by Iran International, Saeed Borji has recently resumed his activities under the cover of a company named Arvin Kimia Abzar, claiming to be involved in the petrochemical industry.

In September 2022, Borji transferred part of his shares in this company to the Center for the Growth of Advanced Defense Technology Units, affiliated with SPND. His partner, Akbar Motallebizadeh, who previously served as an advisor to Mohsen Fakhrizadeh and the head of SPND’s "Shahid Karimi" group, has also played a significant role in these activities.

Both Saeed Borji and Motallebizadeh, who are currently under US sanctions, are overseeing the development of nuclear detonators under the supervision of General Reza Mozaffarinia. Mozaffarinia, the former president of Malek Ashtar University and former deputy for industrial research at the Ministry of Defense, has been the successor to Mohsen Fakhrizadeh at SPND for the past three years. He has been a part of Iran's nuclear weapons program for many years.

An informed source within the Ministry of Defense told Iran International that the formation of the independent SPND organization with its own budget and without oversight is a crucial part of the Islamic Republic's nuclear weapons program.

Why did Pezeshkian keep Eslami in charge? 
The program has another key player. Earlier this week, Masoud Pezeshkian, Iran’s new president, retained Mohammad Eslami as the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. Eslami is a pivotal figure in Iran's nuclear weapons program who is very different from previous heads of the Atomic Energy Organization.

Between 1987 and 1989, Eslami managed a sensitive mission as the deputy head of development projects at the Defense Industries Organization. He led a team sent by the Islamic Republic to Dubai for a secret meeting with Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist who later admitted to transferring nuclear technology and enrichment equipment to Iran.

In one of the nuclear documents stolen from Iran, Eslami’s role is prominently featured. As the head of the Defense Industries Training and Research Institute, he had overseen all aspects of Iran’s military nuclear program, including Project Amad, which was supervised by Fakhrizadeh.

Eslami continued to serve as the deputy for industrial and research affairs at the Ministry of Defense for two years after the JCPOA was signed. According to sources within the 4 / 4Ministry of Defense and SPND, Eslami's retention was ordered by Khamenei to maintain the cohesion of the new three-member team leading Iran's military nuclear program.

Shifting to nuclear weapons for deterrence
A Western diplomat told Iran International that Iran's suspicious nuclear activities have raised concerns among the United States, Israel, and European countries. Following the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas' political bureau in Tehran said the Islamic Republic's deterrence policy, which relied heavily on proxy forces, has lost its effectiveness, something Khamenei and other government officials are fully aware of.

This reality might have driven the Islamic Republic to consider pursuing another form of deterrence. On the day Pezeshkian presented his ministerial picks to the Parliament, Iranian lawmaker Mohammad-Reza Sabbaghian told the open session, "What logic or law dictates that arrogant powers should have nuclear weapons, but Iran should not?"

He added, "We call on the Supreme National Security Council to review the new circumstances and recommend to the Supreme Leader that, considering dynamic Islamic jurisprudence, the path be cleared for the development of nuclear weapons."

This could be the final, and perhaps most dangerous, arrow in Khamenei's quiver.