Why do Iranian clerics and officials speak the way they do?
Foreigners are often baffled by the vague, poetic, and indirect way Iranian officials speak, while Iranians, though more accustomed to this style of communication, often find it frustrating as well.
Shia Islamists, whether clerics or laymen, preachers or officials, often speak in a way that discourages critical thinking and engagement. Their audience expects serious and decisive words, as these Islamists hold significant influence over the fate of the Iranian people. However, their speeches are designed to stifle analytical thought, suppress demands, and leave listeners in a state of uncertainty. What are the characteristics of this style of communication?
The first tactic is to position oneself as a savior, effectively shutting down any demands or questions. Words from the savior are treated as invaluable treasures to be appreciated, not analyzed or criticized. For example, the head of the policy council for Friday imams across the country stated, "All people of Iran owe a national debt to the Friday prayer headquarters of Mashhad." This implies that there is no room for accountability. The authorities of the Islamic Republic see themselves as creditors to the people, rather than debtors or responders.
The second tactic is to present oneself as ascetic and devout, seemingly unconcerned with power, wealth, or status, while having unfettered access to the nation's resources. For instance, Kazem Nourmofidi, Khamenei's representative in Golestan Province, says, "The most important right of God is that His servants do not set their hearts on position, status, and wealth, but follow the path of obedience to God… Attachment to worldly matters is a sign of being distant from God's piety." Ironically, the person preaching this has a corruption case and is part of a group that controls the country’s resources. When he speaks of "servants," he refers to followers, not religious leaders.
The third characteristic is a lack of accountability. Shia Islamists tend to blame the country's problems and crises on external factors, from America and Israel to the West, modernity, and liberalism. For example, Habibollah Sha'bani, Khamenei's representative in Hamedan Province, claims that "liberal views and feminist tendencies... have created cultural problems in the country. What is presented as modernity today contributes to cultural and social issues." Given how disconnected these views are from reality, engaging in meaningful dialogue with such individuals often proves futile.
The fourth characteristic is the bold linking of unrelated matters. For example, there may be no significant connection between the decision to have children and wearing the hijab, but such a connection is nonetheless asserted, aligning support for family values with support for mandatory hijab. Hossein Seyyed Samei, head of the Islamic Propaganda Department of Dilijan, claims, "If no action is taken regarding chastity and hijab, the economy and the foundations of the family will be damaged, and society will face an aging population in the future."
Another example is linking divorce to communication tools. Hossein Hosseini Qomi, an instructor at the Qom Seminary, states, "The main reason for divorce is mobile phones, Instagram, and free and open cyberspace. If you want the foundation of the family not to be destroyed, you must first control virtual space, then control the street and market space, and take the areas of sinning seriously." These connections are made to align various social and cultural issues under a single ideological framework, regardless of the actual relevance between them.
The fifth characteristic is portraying themselves as victims. This rhetoric began when Islamists were not in power but has continued even as they hold significant authority. Despite the fact that Sunnis in Iran are denied the right to have mosques in major cities, Shia clerics frequently complain about restrictions on Shia Islamic centers in other countries, often imposed due to concerns over terrorism and the preaching of hate. For example, Hossein Nouri Hamdani, a state-sponsored religious figure, condemned the closure of the Hamburg Islamic Center by German police in July, calling it "a great cultural injustice, a violation of the sanctities of all Muslims, and an attack on the rights of all united people who support justice, freedom, spirituality, and human rights." This narrative allows them to deflect criticism and maintain a stance of moral superiority, even in the face of legitimate concerns about their actions.
The sixth characteristic is creating an exaggerated, illusory need for the presence of Shia clerics. For instance, Mohammad Reza Modaresi Yazdi, a member of the Guardian Council, claims, "The Islamic Republic needs seminary students in various fields... The Islamic society is hungry for virtuous seminary students, and the people also need them in their lives." However, no research or surveys support such a claim.
The seventh characteristic is tautology, where clerics use circular reasoning to reinforce their points. They argue that if people engage in religious practices, they will undergo religious transformation. For example, Abdul Karim Abedini, Khamenei's representative in Qazvin province, says, "If people have a relationship with the mosque, congregational prayers, pulpits and preachers, we will witness change, and religious concerns in society will be strengthened." Essentially, this means, "If people observe their religiosity, they will become religious."
They project their own beliefs and interests onto the general public. For example, Nasser Makarem Shirazi, a state-sponsored religious figure, claims, "People still consider the clergy as a reliable authority in their religion and world, and they expect them to interpret the Holy Quran and explain the hadiths... People expect the seminaries to guide them to happiness, both in this world and the hereafter." However, no independent research or surveys support this assertion.
All the rhetoric mentioned above can be easily dismissed by the public without any real consequence. Propagandists of the Islamic Republic speak not to inform or analyze, but simply to speak. Their words neither convey valuable information, articulate policies, nor address the concerns and demands of the people. Shia Islamists essentially exploit their audience, offering nothing in return for their attention. Listening to them does little to enlighten the public about governance or spirituality. To them, speaking is synonymous with ruling and fulfilling divine responsibilities, devoid of any civil accountability.
Ali Khamenei publishes a poem from time to time to remind the Iranian people that he is not only in the business of wiping Israel off the map and slaughtering Jews and dissidents but also has a soft and mystical side. In his new sonnet, he calls himself "a guru" and "in the color of spring". He depicts himself as a flood that borrows its freshness from mountains. His mysticism is a reaction to a lack of charismatic perception in the minds and hearts of the Iranian people.
As a result, looking to their words for insights into the government’s policies, plans, or decisions is misguided. These individuals are merely propagandists of a religious totalitarian regime, and everything they say serves to bolster the authority and survival of this system. They have no red lines. Their rhetoric is filled with lies, carelessness, speculation, and conspiracy theories. They do not speak to convey facts or realistic perspectives; they speak to create illusions.
* All the quotes in this article were taken from the short news section of Iran International Persian website in July 2024.
