INSIGHT

Why is Iran's religious symbolism politically significant?

Maryam Sinaiee
Maryam Sinaiee

British Iranian journalist and political analyst

Maddah performing at Supreme Leader's mourning ceremony in 2023
Maddah performing at Supreme Leader's mourning ceremony in 2023

President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian’s participation in numerous Muharram mourning ceremonies over the past week has highlighted the growing influence of lay 'eulogists' in the politics of the Islamic Republic.

Some pundits interpret Pezeshkian’s much-publicized participation at these ceremonies, and his speeches in some instances, as an attempt to appeal to a broader population than those who voted for him in the recent snap elections, during which most famed and influential ‘eulogists’ (maddahs) publicly endorsed his rivals.

Ashura, the anniversary of the killing of Shias’ Imam Hussein 1,400 years ago, is one of the most significant dates on Iran’s religious and political calendar. Hussein, the son of Ali—the fourth Caliph after Prophet Muhammad—and himself a victim of assassination, was killed in a dispute over who should rule the expanding Arab empire. This event is central to Shia Islam, which primarily continues the power dispute from fourteen centuries ago.

Iran’s clerical regime is based on the religious ideology that regards Ali and Hussein as the rightful heirs to Muhammad and Islam. Therefore, religious symbolism plays a crucial role in the politics of the Islamic Republic. The Shiite rulers believe their legitimacy draws from Hussein’s killing on October 10, 680. They pay special attention to Ashura and other religious occasions to mobilize people and claim political support through various ceremonies.

A painting depicting the "martyrdom of Hussein" in Karbala.
A painting depicting the "martyrdom of Hussein" in Karbala.

Maddahs play an increasingly influential role in the regime's religious propaganda. They are laymen who perform eulogies of Shia imams, often accompanied by stirring music to attract younger audiences at religious gatherings. Since the 1990s, the status of maddahs in mourning ceremonies has significantly expanded, elevating their role to be on par with, if not more prominent than, that of clerics.

Some maddahs have also formed strong political alliances with rival politicians. They comment on political matters and disputes and together with their congregations often act as political pressure groups. Sitting next to a ceremony's maddah is usually interpreted as a political endorsement.

Some famous maddahs supported the ultra-hardliner Saeed Jalili in the recent snap elections while others rallied behind his more pragmatist rival Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf.

Maddahs and their profession enjoy Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s support. Some maddahs known for their highly aggressive political views often perform at his public mourning events.

The Jomhouri Eslami newspaper, a conservative daily run by a cleric in Tehran, described the increasing involvement of maddahs and their mourning groups in politics as "political games," a "bitter fact," and a "deadly disease" that cannot be ignored.

In Ashura ceremony men beat themselves with chains to feel pain as those who were killed in Karbala.
In Ashura ceremony men beat themselves with chains to feel pain as those who were killed in Karbala.

The paper argued in article on July 14 that endorsements by maddahs and their claims that “saving Islam depended on voting for one or another of the candidates” and that the victory of the rival could “obliterate religion” represent “a clear deviation” from the righteous path.

“Some of these people desire to appoint presidents and some others are seeking to turn the Islamic Republic into a ‘republic of maddahs’!” the newspaper which often voices the concerns of conservative clerics wrote.

Some well-known maddahs, such as Mansour Arzi and Mahmoud Karimi, have insulted and slandered high-ranking political figures, including presidents like Mohammad Khatami, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, and Hassan Rouhani, in their highly politically charged eulogies. These maddahs have acted with immunity, especially when their actions were perceived as aligning with Khamenei's wishes. In fact, the rise of maddahs has coincided with the ascendancy of Khamenei in the past three decades.

Maddahs are often affiliated with one or more mourning groups (hey’at), which may be funded entirely or partially by donations from various sources, including mosques, neighborhood residents, clerics or groups of clerics, guilds, wealthy and influential business owners, government bodies, and municipalities.

The principal role of hey’ats is organizing gatherings to commemorate the martyrdom of Imam Hussein.

The ceremonies and processions take place mainly during the first ten days of the Islamic month of Muharram and on Arba’in (Arbaeen) that marks the fortieth day of the Imam’s martyrdom.

Hey’ats, which played a significant political role in Iran's Constitutional Revolution of 1901, the uprising that followed the arrest of Ruhollah Khomeini in 1963, as well as the Islamic Revolution of 1979 have also assumed the role of political pressure groups over the past three decades.

Some hey’ats and their maddahs are believed to be closely connected with the Revolutionary Guards’ (IRGC) militia force (Basij) and security forces.

There are at least 150,000 maddahs in Iran now some of whom receive “astronomical” sums as “gifts” for their much-advertised performances from hey’ats as well as benefits and healthcare services from government and state propaganda bodies.