The Iranian presidential election has demonstrated yet another attempt by Iran's "reformists" to try to change the Islamic Republic gradually instead of either accepting the status quo or agreeing with a revolution.
Ostracized from politics by hardliner followers of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei since 2020, pro-reform political factions were beginning to show impatience in the face of the ongoing monopolization of power by ultraconservatives. The pressure of public anger over a declining economy and more repression were pushing reformist leaders such as former President Mohammad Khatami to sound more defiant than ever.
Khatami surprised many in February when he announced his abstention from highly manipulated parliamentary elections, and fewer observers were expecting him to endorse the presidential vote to replace Ebrahim Raisi who was killed in a helicopter crash in May. In fact little had changed since February as the un-elected Guardian Council disqualified key presidential contenders from entering the race.
Gambling Reformers
By participating in the 2024 elections with Masoud Pezeshkian, a relatively moderate politician, as their candidate, the so-called reformist faction perhaps squandered a significant opportunity to rebuild its credibility with voters who appeared to have lost confidence in the political system. A large majority had just abstained from the March 1 parliamentary elections.
The first round of voting did not bode well for those who hoped a majority will bless the election with their participation. More than 60% abstained from voting on June 28.
Previously, they had allowed the regime's hardliners, to employ brutal crackdowns on the 2017 and 2019 protests due to their backing of the Rouhani administration, even urging severe suppression of protesters.
During the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom movement, some members stood in solidarity with the protesters, but it seemed too little and too late.
Yet, when the Guardian Council qualified their third-ranking candidate, Pezeshkian, they swiftly reverted to supporting the regime's “enforcers”.
In this way, they – once again – they missed the chance to appease two-thirds of the population who boycotted the elections, achieving no significant victories.
The costs of having a candidate participate in the debates far outweighed any potential benefits.
Three Models of Reformism in the Islamist Government
The Islamic Republic has so far witnessed two models of "reformism."
The first model was ushered in by President Mohammad Khatami and his allies between 1997 and 2005. They aimed for political development by strengthening civil society, empowering elected institutions over appointed ones, and expanding press freedom.
They were ultimately defeated by Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards in all three areas.
The second model was led by President Hassan Rouhani and his team between 2013 and 2021, who aimed to end the oil and banking embargoes by de-escalating tensions with the West through the JCPOA agreement – hoping to improve everyday life alongside the operation of nuclear centrifuges.
But, when the Biden administration sought to return to the JCPOA, Khamenei’s loyalists in the parliament, with his support, passed the Strategic Action Law to Cancel the Sanctions, effectively hardening Tehran's position in nuclear talks and blocking any chance of a quick agreement.
If Pezeshkian secures the presidency, we’ll see the dawn of a third model of reformism, based on his campaign platform.
Learning from their previous two defeats, the reformists have adopted a new approach towards Ali Khamenei and his government, conveying two clear messages: first, they have no intention of challenging Khamenei or the institutions under his control and are willing to cooperate with his loyalists; second, they claim they can execute his policies more effectively and better justify the government's corruption and repression. Naturally, Khamenei desires both efficient and loyal executors.
Khamenei's Preference
From Jalili and Pezeshkian's statements in the debates, it is clear that Jalili is the candidate who will prioritize the full implementation of Ali Khamenei's policies.
Jalili's platform is solely focused on defending the “resistance front” policies in the Middle East, with the consequence of economic isolation. He also fully endorses a national internet network with filtering and slow speeds, mandatory hijab, severe suppression of opposition, and a strategic pivot towards the East.
If, however, Khamenei seeks to improve relations with the West, reduce sanctions through negotiations and de-escalate tensions with regional countries, and minimize the possibility of mass protests domestically, he would prefer Pezeshkian.
The possible election of Donald Trump has apparently rattled nerves in Tehran and some argue that Khamenei may be hedging his bets by allowing a non-hardliner to become president. The fact that former foreign minister Javad Zarif has become the most visible face of the Pezeshkian campaign could also be a signal of his return to the diplomatic arena, where the Islamic Republic finds itself more isolated than ever.
The opinions expressed by the author are not necessarily the views of Iran International.