Iran's Hardliners Competing Heavily For Seats In Next Parliament

As conservatives are expected to dominate in the March parliamentary elections in Iran, smaller hardline groups are emerging in the run to secure seats in the Majles.

With the absence of reformist and moderate groups from the electoral competition due to disqualifications by the Interior Ministry and anticipated vetting by the Guardian Council, the conservative factions are seemingly unconcerned about the potential implications, notably the prospect of low voter turnout on the election day, March 1. In fact, there are reports that ultraconservatives would even welcome a mere 5-percent turnout.

Competition in the elections is taking place in the apparent absence of reformist and moderate groups that have been effectively barred from running for the Majles as most of their well-known candidates have been disqualified by the Interior ministry and other are expected to be barred by the hardliner-dominated Guardian Council.

The conservatives, however, do not appear to be bothered by the implications of rejecting other groups, most notably, a low turnout on the election day, March 1. Former reformist lawmaker Mostafa Kavakebian has quoted an incumbent conservative MP as having said that the ultraconservatives will be even happy with a 5-percent turnout.

However, the conservative factions are seemingly unconcerned about the potential implications of barring others, notably the prospect of low voter turnout on the election five-percent turnout.

While the ultraconservative Paydari Party, which currently holds sway in the government and parliament, maintains its dominant position, several smaller conservative groups are emerging, hoping to secure a few seats in the Majles to establish their political presence for the next four years.

Recent reports on the conservative landscape before the elections have identified at least seven conservative groups challenging the dominance of the Paydari Party. These groups all bear names suggesting support for the Islamic Revolution, making it difficult for non-Iranian readers to discern their positions. The key figures leading these groups, however, provide better insights into their current political stances.

These figures include vigilante leader Hossein Allahkaram, Housing Minister Mehrdad Bazrpash, Majles Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, controversial hardline cleric Hamid Rasaei, and other lesser-known conservative political figures. While they currently identify as conservatives, their ultimate goal is to secure a share of the limited 290 Majles seats.

Conservative activist Hedayatollah Khademi says the seven conservative groups might be shortlisted to around four groups. He says voters will look at the candidates’ background and will reject many of them even before they go to the polls.

Each one of these groups aims to nominate at least 30 candidates for the 30 seats allocated to Tehran, where most Iranian politicians are based. In contrast, the reform and moderate camp has struggled to present even 30 candidates, as vetting and disqualifications by the Interior Ministry and the Guardian Council have limited their options. Former President Hassan Rouhani is said to be planning to give a list of only 16 candidates form his Moderation and Development Party, and apparently, he is not finding that as easy as he might have thought.

Another conservative analyst, Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani, highlights a curious aspect of this competition. While a political heavyweight like Ghalibaf may secure a seat in the Majles for himself, it is unlikely that he will be able to bring anyone closely associated with him into the next parliament.

Moreover, this competitive landscape among conservatives is likely to result in a significant division within Iran's conservative bloc. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who seeks to diminish the influence of moderates and reformists while maintaining conservative power, appears to welcome this division, as it could hinder the Paydari Party from winning an absolute majority, potentially creating complications for the political system. Khamenei's aim seems to be consolidating power by weakening and dividing conservative factions to ensure his own supremacy.